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198 McHenry’s July trip to see George Washington at his home in Virginia should have been a pleasure. But travel was never really comfortable for him, and he could not stay long enough to enjoy the distractions of Mount Vernon and its owner. Boarding the mail stage on the morning of the eighth of July, he would not arrive at Washington’s plantation until the evening of the eleventh. The trip was long, hot, and dusty, but the matter was too important to trust to the unreliable mail system. McHenry was to ask Washington to command the armies being raised. It was the beginning of the Relative Rank Controversy, a dispute over how to rank the top three major generals that would consume the next four months and seriously impact McHenry’s reputation. The problem began with Pickering, who was once again dissatisfied. He had never thought much of Washington as a general—Pickering often “overestimated his own talent and underestimated those around him.” Knowing, however, that the general would rely heavily on his subordinates, Pickering decided to get Hamilton appointed second in command. Since he knew that Adams despised the New Yorker, Washington must demand him. So as soon as Pickering learned of McHenry’s mission, he surreptitiously wrote the general a letter supporting Hamilton. Admitting Adams’s “disinclination” to appoint the New Yorker, Pickering argued that Hamilton’s appointment was “of such vast importance to the welfare of the country, that I am willing to risk any consequences of my frank and honest endeavors to secure it.” He was serious—Pickering would do what needed to be done in order to get Hamilton . When certain he was right, Pickering would manipulate to get his way. He had, in fact, attacked and even destroyed at least one person before. In 1795, trusting to his own abilities with French, he had mistranslated a letfifteen “I Must Be Allowed to Chuse” George Washington “I Must Be Allowed to Chuse” 199 ter that ruined then Secretary of State Edmund Randolph. Since Pickering rarely doubted himself, it failed to occur to him that he might have made a mistake—and he had a marked inability to see that men of differing qualities can contribute their talents to a situation and achieve the desired end. Currently, however, the weight of Washington’s opinion was necessary to sway Adams. Washington must be convinced that Hamilton was the “one man who will gladly be your second, but who will not, I presume, because I think he ought not, be the second to any other military commander in the United States.”1 On the morning of July 11 and before McHenry’s arrival, Washington replied , agreeing that Hamilton’s services ought to be obtained “at almost any price.” But he argued that Hamilton’s brilliance did not outweigh all other tactical matters. Washington believed that if France attacked, she would probably assault the South, which was near the French West Indies. It was also strategically weakest and full of Francophile Republicans and slaves that might easily rebel. For these reasons Washington thought an illustrious southerner was in order.2 In fact, he had a southerner in mind, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. The accomplished South Carolinian was on his way back from France now, and might not serve beneath Hamilton, whom he had outranked during the Revolution. Further, Washington knew Pickering to be mistaken; Hamilton would serve below others. He had weeks earlier written Washington “the place in which I should hope to be most useful is that of Inspector General with a command in the line.”3 So, as of the morning of July 11, Washington planned to place Pinckney as second in command, ranking over Hamilton. In the meantime, however, Hamilton had visited Philadelphia and changed his mind, probably influenced by Pickering. So he wrote Washington a necessarily delicate letter. After expressing surprise that the Virginian had not been consulted prior to his nomination, Hamilton urged the general to accept. High stations require good men, he said, especially since Adams’s military ideas were “of the wrong sort.” Then Hamilton focused on Washington’s prime weakness—his concern for his name. “If you accept it will be conceived that the arrangement [of officers] is yours & you will be responsible for it in reputation.”4 Washington, he hinted, needed to deal with proven and reliable men or his name might be ruined. No one, Hamilton knew, fit that category better than he. After decades of serving together, Hamilton...

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