James McHenry, Forgotten Federalist

THIRTEEN: “Are We Forever to Be Overawed and Directed by Party Passions?”

174 The transition from Washington to John Adams was difficult even in Adams’s earliest days. Certainly, Adams himself was part of the problem. Of average height and given the nickname “his rotundity” due to his middle-aged girth, he was brilliant and capable of great and honest introspection. But he could also be suspicious, jealous, stubborn, irascible, and often kept important thoughts to himself. This last quality proved questionable with regard to his cabinet, for Adams had chosen to keep Washington ’s men rather than imply any criticism of the former president’s choices: McHenry as secretary of war, Pickering as secretary of state, and Wolcott as secretary of the treasury. At present, foreign affairs worried Adams. Gallic anger over Monroe’s recall worried Americans. Washington had already sent Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to replace Monroe, and many now considered it wise to send two more men to France to comprise an extraordinary commission. Such a mission had gone to England to negotiate the Jay Treaty, and corresponding treatment might appease France. Hamilton had suggested such a mission to Washington before the latter left office, and now Adams gave the matter serious thought.1 But who else should join Pinckney? Adams first consulted with VicePresident Jefferson, who demurred, and then turned to Oliver Wolcott. Adams’s idea was to dispatch someone high in the Republican ranks to assuage both the other party and the other country. But when Adams asked Wolcott’s thoughts regarding Madison as commissioner, the response astonished him.2 Shocked, Wolcott blurted out his fears. Madison had opposed the Jay Treaty, fought assumption, and consistently resisted Washington’s— and Hamilton’s—programs. Madison and Jefferson together had created thirteen “Are We Forever to Be Overawed and Directed by Party Passions?” John Adams “Overawed by Party Passions” 175 the Republican party alliance, seemingly destroying unity and transforming everything into a struggle. “Sending Mr. Madison will make dire work among the passions of our parties in Congress, and out of doors, through the states!” But Adams, who had hoped to calm rather than agitate the waters, inquired, “Are we forever to be overawed and directed by party passions ?” In “profound gloom and solemn countenance” Wolcott spoke for the cabinet. They did not trust Madison and if Adams chose to send the Republican leader, “we are willing to resign.”3 This was a bold statement; had Adams consulted the more temperate McHenry, the conversation would almost certainly not have ended in this threat, and if it had, the delivery would have been much gentler. Although McHenry felt strongly about the composition of the mission, he also hoped to have a cordial and cooperative relationship with this new president. In fact, McHenry and his clerks had spent many hours copying all their significant documents for the new president, involving hundreds of pages of materials regarding Indian treaties, agents, talks, the army and navy, forts, and military stores. It was both a professional and considerate act, since McHenry knew that Adams would be only vaguely aware of his office’s policies and history.4 Hence, Wolcott’s astonishing move was indeed telling, for the cabinet’s threat to resign reflected both their deep feelings on this issue and their assessment of Adams. Statesman though he was, Adams did not carry Washington ’s authority. Despite his illustrious political career, he failed to inspire men to follow him, and the cabinet was no different.5 Indeed, they undoubtedly still thought of Adams as vice president, as the second man rather than the first. Wolcott’s outburst showed clearly that the cabinet was, as Adams already knew and accepted, mentally and politically independent of the new president. But they were all good Federalists, and Adams had won the presidency by only three votes; in retaining the cabinet he aimed to keep the support of the greatest number of Federalists. Adams also did not wish to appear to be critical of Washington’s choices; ousting them would have thus cost him politically.6 So Adams faced a group of people with set habits and ideas regarding government policy. Establishing new patterns and authority would be an uphill struggle, and this act of the cabinet’s was not a good sign. Adams made it clear that he did not want anyone’s resignation, and there the matter lay, except that it left incorrect impressions. It gave Wolcott the impression that he had single-handedly averted a Madison mission to [3.141.193.158] Project MUSE (2024-04...