Containing Russia's Nuclear Firebirds: Harmony and Change at the International Science and Technology Center

8. The Nuclear File

CHAPTER EIGHT The Nuclear File U.S. pays millions to Russian scientists not to sell A-secrets. —Washington Post, 1994 For now, sound economic arguments for opening the closed nuclear cities in the Urals are trumped by national security concerns and by nostalgia for the past. —U.S. Consulate General, Yekaterinburg, 2010 When diplomats first raised the concept in 1991 of an international center to support redirection of Russian weapons scientists’ expertise to civilian tasks, the threat of primitive nuclear bombs constructed by disenfranchised rogue groups was in the forefront of the discussions. The possibility of a nuclear catastrophe dominated istc deliberations for many years. Even when other types of proliferation threats moved onto center stage, the nuclear issue was repeatedly cited as a principal rationale in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo for continuation of istc programs. Beginning in 1992, Russian nuclear authorities in the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) had the host-country responsibility for supporting the istc. For ten years, they provided bureaucratic muscle for promoting the general perception within the Russian and other interested governments that financial support for redirection of nuclear scientists was the center’s most urgent task. And the istc parties generally shared this view. A decade later in the early 2000s, however, international financial commitments to the istc began to decline as concerns over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction spread in many directions around the world. Also, American and European scientists encouraged Russian biologists to compete more aggressively for available istc funds, and a smaller share of the already reduced funding went to the nuclear establishment in Russia. The advocates within Minatom [154] chapter eight and its successor organization, Rosatom, then began to change their stripes. They gradually became somewhat skeptical about the need for the highvisibility role of an istc that was now losing some of its financial clout. They led the steady erosion of political support within the Russian government for the center. As discussed in chapter 4, the reasons for the decline in interest in the istc among Russian officials extended beyond reductions in the center’s financial base, although the shrinking budget repeatedly disappointed key nuclear scientists in Russia and abroad. In contrast, the Russian treasury was providing the institutions of Minatom and then Rosatom with increased financial resources. And by that time, the security systems at nuclear facilities had been substantially tightened. The Russian government had developed alternative international mechanisms for addressing nuclear issues, particularly through bilateral programs with the United States, Japan, and the European Union. Thus, the Russian government, and particularly Rosatom, gave less and less weight to the importance of the istc as a source of external financing or as a mechanism for coordination of activities of interested states. Indeed, within a few years, whenever an outsider asked a knowledgeable Russian scientist about the identity of the officials who argued against maintaining the center’s programs in Russia, the finger of the insider inevitably pointed to staff members of Rosatom. ASSESSING THE EXTENT OF THE NUCLEAR THREAT Observing developments in North Korea, Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and elsewhere, officials in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo have consistently emphasized that the advancing scientific capabilities of rogue countries with nuclear ambitions are a grave danger for the world. The policies and programs of these four rogue states dominated early discussions of the need for the istc. While the countries were following different paths to master the art of bomb building, each could benefit from the experience and know-how of renegade Russian scientists, argued the center’s advocates. The nuclear issue continues to be the focus of the spotlight that shines on potential disasters looming over the horizon. To many, the possibility of a nuclear calamity increases anxieties far more than other worldwide threats of the modern era. Frequently, the international community has singled out for special attention a dozen countries that could soon have the capability to assemble nuclear weapons in a short period. At other times, the list has been expanded The Nuclear File [155] to include as many as two dozen countries with worrisome levels of nuclear capabilities and uncertain ambitions. The specter of a devastating nuclear event is a powerful motivator of international action. Suspicion of a nuclear threat propelled the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Then it provided a persuasive argument for maintaining nato troops in Afghanistan, next door to the Pakistan nuclear tinder box. Even Myanmar (formerly Burma) is on...