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22. Conclusions
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C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - T W O Conclusions No SINGLE INDIVIDUAL dominated the first half century of Guatemalan national independence more than Rafael Carrera. Although uneducated , his native intelligence and personal energy enabled him to overcome the intrigues of the "enlightened" Creole elite and enforce a unity on the country that had eluded it since the beginnings of the disintegration of the Spanish empire in 1808. Although undisciplined, his intelligence, good judgment, and ability to recognize and command trustworthy advisers served him well. His revolution rode the crest of a strong rejection of liberalism by people of all classes as it restored Hispanic tradition and institutions and established the independent Republic ofGuatemala. Although contemporaries and subsequent critics would often poke fun of his lack of education and his crude manners, fewcould deny his military genius, charismatic appeal to the masses, or ability to get to the core issuesofa problem quickly. The grievances of the rural masses against the liberal governments of both the State of Guatemala and the federation had become numerous by 1837. They reflected the insensitivity of liberal leaders to the social and psychological security of the general population as well as their inexperience in republican politics. In their enthusiasm to create a modern, republican state, they had looked to the countrysidefor the land and labor that their economic ambitions required. They encouraged development of mining and export agriculture with little understanding of the effect on the welfare of the majority of the population. In attempting to break the power 456 Conclusions / 457 of the Roman Catholic Church and to seize its lucrative properties, they made powerful enemies among the influential parish priests as well as the ecclesiastical hierarchy, who were so influential with the conservative elite. They exacted forced labor levies to build roads, bridges, jails, and other public works. And the quixotic adoption of the Livingston judicialreforms also alienated influential lawyers, always a dangerous step. Committed to free trade and a minimum of taxes on the entrepreneurial and landholding classes and thus having abolished most of the taxes of the Hispanic period, they burdened the rural masses with a direct head tax reminiscent of the hated tribute. Indian rebellion in eastern El Salvador and highland Guatemala had already reflected indigenous restlessness with liberal reforms, but the liberals, confident of the wisdom of their development model, failed to comprehend the potential power of popular resistance. Placing their faith in military strength and hopes for rising prosperity from their trade policies, they refused to abandon their course until it was too late. The cholera epidemic of 1837 has generally been acknowledged as the straw that broke the camel's back, leading to the Carrera revolution. Frustration over the grievances mentioned above had certainly reached a breaking point when the cholera added to the misery and created panic in some communities. The rural clergy blamed it on the government and attacked efforts of public health officers to ameliorate the disease's spread. But even at that, had it not been for the leadership of Carrera and his ability to rally the peasants into a crude but sustained military resistance, the government in Guatemala might have survived the 1837 cholera crisis. It is doubtful, however, that the liberals could have survived for much longer against the rising conservative reaction to the liberal experiments, a rising tide all across Latin America after 1830. What made Guatemala somewhat unique, however, was that the conservative reaction came in the wake of a successful popular rebellion led by a man of humble origins, a man of the people. This injected elements of class warfare into the reaction. With the accession of the caudillo, advised by many of the rural priests and those who had suffered under the liberal policies, the Guatemalan conservative reaction became more extreme than that in much of the rest of Latin America. In some ways it represents an aberration or caricature of the general conservative reaction that characterized the region. A leading Guatemalan historian, David Vela, attributed Carrera's victory in 1838 to the alliance between the Barrundia faction and the conservatives in what he called "suicide liberalism."1 For the conservatives, the alliance with Barrundia achieved the ouster of Galvez, and then they were able to turn on Barrundia and Valenzuela.Yet in the long run that alliance [3.235.139.122] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 23:04 GMT) 458 / Socioeconomic Change probably didn't make much difference. It...