In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

7 Multiplication and the Value of Life The increasing size of the human population is widely regarded as an ecological problem. A social problem it certainly is, at least in some places; and it results in some measure from people's transactions with other species, since advances in the control of disease must be part of its explanation. Indeed this is already enough to make it an ecological problem. But it also results, plausibly, from poverty in places where life-expectancy is short, and to this extent is to be seen as one facet of the many-sidedproblemof development and underdevelopment, rather than as primarily an ecological issue. There is another ground, however,for regarding it as an ecological problem: its role in causing squalor, pollution, erosion, the loss of forests and the growth of deserts. As remarked in chapter 1, it is probably not the main cause of these problems; but if it even exacerbates them, as it surely does, then its ecological significance is considerable. The growth in human numbers also seems to endanger numerous nonhuman species, and thus contributes to yet another ecological problem. But before anyone can designate the problem one of 'overpopulation ' (manifestly a normative expression), let alone talk of 'the population bomb',1 some idea is needed of what an optimum human population would be like, or at any rate of what population changes would count as improvements, and thus of what level of population we ought to aim at. This, as Michael Bayles points out,2 is an issue prior to such other population issues as the rate at which change is due and the methods of control to be employed; and it is also an issue which at once takes us to basic principles of normative ethics. It also takes us to basic questions about value, such as whether all life is valuable, or only certain kinds and qualities of life, and, if only 115 116 APPLIED ETHICS certain kinds, then which. To dwellon these issues mayseem to risk losing sight of the practical problems; yet to leavethemunexamined, or to take for granted the answers to them, involves lacking a clear view about what the problems are and what makes them problems. On such a basis as this, even if satisfactory solutions are found, their discovery can at best be an accident, and we stand to overlook ways in which, through provision for a quite different population, we might have made the world a much better place. Principles of obligation and of value in population matters are also required to supplement the discussion of obligations to future generations in chapter 6. It was there claimed that we have farreaching obligations to whatever people there will be. But it was necessary to postpone the question of how many people we should cause to exist or allow there to be; and without some answer to that question the answers so far arrived at are plainly deficient. The points so far made may supply some kind of explanation of the fact that most of the writings of philosophers on population issues concern the bearing of basic principles on human numbers rather than issues such as which forms of population control are allowable, and which forms, if any, of political pressure may be employed to foster it. Most of the writers concerned have a vivid awareness of the urgency of population issues, yet their concern to be right over matters of principle must surely be applauded. By contrast, where a philosopher deals only with the more immediate problems, the resulting discussion is prone to appear somewhat superficial,3 and this even though the problems are on a worldwide scale. Yet the laymanwho turns to philosophers for help over mattersof principle mayhere be beset withperplexity.Thus only some theories of normative ethics, those whichmake obligations andjustifications turn on an action's consequences, seem to have anythingrelevant to say on the level of the humanpopulation at future times. Aswehave already seen in chapter 6, other theories either have nothing to offer, or fail to give a satisfactory account of the extent to which principles relating to anything other than consequences override principles of a consequentialist character. Among consequentialist theories, however, negative theories, enjoining the diminution of suffering and misery, would best be satisfied by the painless elimination of humanity altogether, an ideal which clashes with most people's most deeply felt intuitions; while positive theories at least seem to run the risk, by enjoiningthe maximizationof happiness [3.139...

Share