Brazil and the United States: Convergence and Divergence

CHAPTER 6. The Cold War

130 6 The Cold War “I am asking,” declared U.S. Congressman William C. Cramer in 1963, “that no further U.S. loans be made to Señor Goulart’s government until the Communists are cleaned out of it.”1 Throughout the 1950s Brazilian diplomacy sought U.S. financial assistance to fund large-scale projects for industrial development and economic modernization. When the requested aid did not materialize, Brazil demonstrated its annoyance by its refusal to send a token military expeditionary force to take part in the Korean War. In 1958 President Juscelino Kubitschek proposed “Operation Pan America,” a major program of economic development for all the nations of the hemisphere. A negative response , however, was forthcoming from the Eisenhower administration, which interpreted the idea as a calculated ploy to extract American money to finance extravagant expenditures. A separate scheme closely resembling Operation Pan America but devised by the U.S. government later emerged when John F. Kennedy became president in 1961 and was known as the Alliance for Progress. The U.S. attitude of complacency toward Latin America markedly changed during the 1950s as a result of growing anxiety over the perceived rise in the influence of International Communism in the Western Hemisphere. In Brazil, alarm focused on the danger of Communist infiltration especially in the poverty-stricken northeastern region. There was also concern over the “independent ” foreign policy proclaimed by President Jânio Quadros, which stated that Brazil would not automatically take the side of the United States in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. When Quadros resigned in 1961, he was succeeded by the left-wing leader João Goulart. The administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson distrusted Goulart and suspected that he aimed to establish a personal dictatorship that would be vulnerable to Communist infiltration. U.S. policy showed its displeasure by suspending financial aid to the Brazilian federal government. At the same time, covert assistance was given to Goulart’s political opponents, and close relations were cultivated with senior military officers. The personal links were so well known that the coup 131 The Cold War that overthrew Goulart in 1964 was widely believed to be the work of the U.S. embassy in Brazil. While U.S. officials clearly welcomed and had undoubtedly contributed to the overthrow of Goulart, they denied active involvement in executing the coup. Brazilian Disillusionment with the United States The postwar policy of pursuing diplomatic cooperation with the United States resulted in few tangible benefits for Brazil. This was evident in the question of securing preferential support for the modernization and building up of strong Brazilian military forces. The matter was discussed in staff conversations between senior American and Brazilian officers that took place in the spring of 1945. While American military officials appreciated the strategic value of maintaining a close relationship with Brazil in the postwar period, diplomats in the State Department showed less interest. Ambassador Adolf Berle acknowledged that given its territorial size and population, Brazil “is destined to have the major position in the continent,” and that, in contrast to Argentina, “Brazil as an essentially pacific country is not likely to abuse her position; whereas certain other South American countries frequently betray a tendency toward expansionism when they are in a position of military supremacy .” Nevertheless, he considered that Brazil’s ambition to be the leading regional military power was mistaken and ultimately self-defeating because it would be detrimental to the country’s long-term economic and social development . “The money which might be used to provide a sixth rate fleet,” Berle believed, “will tend to impoverish and weaken the country.” True to his New Deal liberalism, he argued that it would be much better spent on mass primary education.2 The reluctance of the Truman administration to provide the desired military assistance provoked critical comment from a Brazilian military that nourished the ambition that their country should aim for the status of a world power. In a conversation between the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Rio, Paul Daniels, and Colonel José Bina Machado in December 1945, the Brazilian officer referred to “the recent growth of anti-American sentiment in high Brazilian Army circles” and stated that “the feeling was growing that the us was inclined to treat Brazil 132 chapter six as a small brother rather than an important nation pledged to full military cooperation.”3 Brazilian diplomats concurred with...