Life's Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World

3. On Imagination, Research—and Petty Rationality

3 OnImagination, Research— and Petty Rationality In science and philosophy the logical and not the emotional man has been thefocal point. The rationality that characterizes the knowledge society is of an extremely limited kind—a petty rationality—that does not ask what are our mostfundamental priorities and valuesas human beings. This rationality has lost sight of our aims and is merely concerned with means.Is the conflict between emotion and rationality real?And is it not often imagination and emotion that drives scientists and scholars? If we survey the philosophical landscape, we see an inner relation between what I will now call the philosophy of emotion and the different components of a philosophical conspectus or system— logic, generalmethodology, cognitive theory, ontology, value theory, descriptive ethics, prescriptive ethics, philosophy ofscience, political philosophy, social philosophy, and aesthetics. In Western philosophy human beings are primarily seen as cognitive creatures. Thought has a unique position in the life of Homo sapiens. In philosophy we have been far more impressed by our highly developed knowledge than by our standards and quality of emotional life. Theory of knowledge and of cognition, in a wide sense of the term, has posed a long series of questions, to which 51 widely differing answershave been given for approximately twentyfivehundred years. As a matter of course, professional philosophy, with its thousands of practitioners, has occasionally dealt with fundamental issues concerning the emotions. Compared with other philosophical subjects there is nonetheless not much to be found in books and articles on this theme. It is virtually the equivalent of how things stand in everyday speech. We do not have many negative expressions about cognition, but a fairly large number where emotions are concerned. For example, we say, "It's only a feeling," or "Keepfeelings out of it." "To become excitable" is a common expression , but not "to become cognitive." "She isverysensitive" is not usually a compliment. Theory ofknowledge isone of the main parts of philosophy. But does emotional theory also have a valid claim to the samestanding? In any case, theory of knowledge has had indirect consequences for everyday life, and emotional theory might have a similar effect. It is almost trivial to maintain that strong feelings may play a part in deciding one's philosophical view of life—even if that view is presented without systematicallyexplainingand acceptingthe function of emotions. What I ask myselfis whether we philosophers might alternate between expressing ourselves as cognitive and as emotional creatures. Like the fundamentally emotional creatures that we are, we might, for example, be more inclined to say things like "I feel that x is closer to the truth than y," "As I feel the world, it is like this . . . " "As I feel myself, I am like this.. . ." Might philosophers not put more emphasis on discoveringat which points emotions appear in the succession of thoughts? Weought occasionally to permit ourselves to say, without reluctance or awkward excuses, "Well—at that point I was affected by the feeling that..." To which a critic might reply, "I feel this in quite another way," and then proceed to describe how he felt about the matter. Naturally, the next step will be to search for reasons and causes why in this particular instance feelings were so different or led to something so different. 52 LIFE'S PHILOSOPHY According to one's upbringing or position in society, there is a greater or lesser tendency to say,"I feel that. . .," or "The wayI feel about. . ." But such statements often seem defensive: "I maintained x but admit that I only felt that way.. . ." In judging for or against, and in evaluating the particular consequences, one person will appear to rely on cognition (insights, facts) more or less exclusively, while someone else will maintain that, strictly speaking, that person is talking "only" about feelings. One reason for the comparatively low standing that emotions are still accorded in society at large is that people ascribe to them little or no value as knowledge. Despite opposition, society gives a higher priority to polishing the technical and knowledge-gathering abilities of people. Even in the environmental movement, it is said that those who support a technocratic-economic rationality are too full of emotion. In other words, they are seen as being driven by emotions and not intelligence. The existence of such attitudes, both in society and in philosophy, proves how technologizing has stamped the educational system. It implies a false appreciation of...