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CHAPTER THREE. Japanese Nuclear Decision-Making
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CHAPTER THREE Japanese Nuclear Decision-Making Japan’s continued non-nuclear status seems rather puzzling. With high levels of economic, scientific, and technological development, and a sophisticated nuclear energy program, including a plutonium-based fuel cycle, Japan certainly has the means to develop a nuclear weapons program. And bordered by nuclear-armed neighbors with which it has had armed conflicts, Japan also has the motive to acquire nuclear weapons. “Japan lives in a dangerous neighborhood,” as one senior U.S. Japan expert notes, especially in light of the continuing North Korean nuclear crisis.1 As noted in chapter 1, although one can argue that not seeking nuclear weapons may result from having had such weapons dropped on its territory, one can also argue that acquiring nuclear weapons and second-strike capability is the way to avoid recurrence of that tragedy. Japan’s non-nuclear status is not due to a lack of debate about it. Since the 1950s, Japanese leadership has considered the nuclear question several times. But for almost forty years, Japanese decision-makers have continued to forgo nuclear weapons and affirm the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The question for policymakers is why. To answer that question, this chapter first examines the social and security environments that undergird Japan’s nuclear stance. Next, the chapter explores the four major periods of nuclear decisionmaking in Japan, before turning to how the international social environment influenced Japanese nuclear forbearance. Finally, findings are compared to the theoretical expectations presented in chapter 1 to see which the evidence supports and in what ways. The case study evidence leads to a conclusion that early on, a mix of realist and constructivist expectations best explains Japanese nuclear forbearance. During that time, many political elites wanted their own nuclear deterrent but chose not to pursue that option for two reasons. First, domestic political opponents, motivated by normative commitments and strengthened in part by the international norm against proliferation, would [54] Chapter three have made such a choice very costly and perhaps impossible for pronuclear elites. Thus, the “persuaded” segment of Japanese society forced the pronuclear politicians into a policy of social conformity. This was likely possible due to the second reason, the U.S. guarantee of extended deterrence, without which the conservatives might not have accepted Japan’s non-nuclear status. As time passed, more of the political elite grew to accept the international and domestic norm against nuclear acquisition, leading to a larger percentage being “persuaded.” In conjunction with this, the Japanese elite underwent profound changes in perspective on security and the best means of achieving it. Thus, even though Japan’s security and material environment has changed for the worse in the past several years, the country remains firmly committed to cooperation, diplomacy, and a non-nuclear policy. JAPANESE SOCIAL AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT In Japanese nuclear decision-making, the social and security environments loom large.2 In terms of social environment, while many issues shape the nuclear debate in Japan, the following discussion highlights the three most important: the Japanese Peace Constitution, domestic antimilitarism and antinuclear sentiment, and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. In terms of security environment, this chapter addresses three main issues: the lack of discussion in Japan of all security issues, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and Japanese concern over the Chinese military threat. Japanese Peace Constitution The Japanese constitution is often referred to as the Peace Constitution, and Japanese often refer to their state as a Peace Nation, due to Article 9 of their constitution, which states: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained . The right of the belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”3 Over the past fifty years, Article 9 has become an integral part of Japanese identity.4 Tetsuya Kataoka notes, “Article 9 is to the Japanese constitution what the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is to the American consti- [3.238.233.189] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 19:23 GMT) Japanese Nuclear Decision-Making [55] tution: more than mere written words on a piece of document, it has become the very essence of the Japanese regime or polity.”5 Various attempts to amend...