Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint

Preface

PREFACE This project began during my one-year tenure in the U.S. intelligence community , where I analyzed countries with nuclear weapons programs. We focused a great deal of time and effort on these states: what activities they were engaged in, and more important, how we could stop them. However, a few months into the job, a series of questions struck me: What about the 95 percent of states that are not trying to develop nuclear weapons? Why aren’t they? What can we learn from them? In our intelligence work, we were selecting on the dependent variable: examining only the states that wanted nuclear weapons . If we studied states that could develop a nuclear option but chose not to, what could we learn? Could we unearth insights to assist us in dealing with countries that did seek nuclear weapons? Given that almost all states have exercised nuclear restraint, was there a systemic variable at work—one that for some reason lacked influence in our rogue states? That set of questions fueled the research that led to my dissertation and this book. I began by examining traditional approaches to proliferation and quickly found them wanting. Achieving better understanding of nuclear proliferation and its prevention required two dramatic changes. First, instead of focusing primarily on cases of proliferation, we also need to examine nonproliferation— the states that have considered the nuclear option and exercised restraint. Second , instead of focusing solely on a state’s security environment, we also need to examine the social environment—the norms and ideas shaping how state elites conceptualize “security” and “success.” The common refrain that state decisions about nuclear weapons are motivated by “security” is meaningless. The question is, what do states consider to help or hurt their security? Why do most states believe their security does not require nuclear weapons, while a few believe the opposite? How is it that a state such as Egypt—having lost in conflict against a nuclear-armed adversary and with regional competitors known to be working on nuclear weapons—does not require nuclear weapons for security, whereas South Africa—a state facing few external security threats—did want them? [xiv] Preface By addressing these two issues, we open our analysis to a wider set of variables that influence state decision-making on nuclear weapons. If we want to control nuclear proliferation, we must start by honestly addressing how states conceptualize the value of nuclear weapons. This project proposes a framework, based on a combination of social psychology and constructivism, for identifying and measuring this wider set of variables. In addition, it offers insights into the psychological mechanisms whereby these variables shape choices on nuclear weapons. To test the utility of this framework in the real world, it is applied to five countries that have opted out of the nuclear arms race: Japan, Egypt, Germany, Sweden, and Libya. The results offer a much better understanding of how states make decisions about nuclear weapons and, as important , provide ideas about how to shape policy to promote nonproliferation and stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the globe. Most authors owe both intellectual and practical debts to numerous people. I had no sense of how overwhelmingly true this was until embarking on my own manuscript, which benefited tremendously from the advice and scrutiny of my dissertation committee: Martha Finnemore, Deborah Avant, and Dalia Dassa Kaye. They provided guidance and suggestions over the course of several years, and this project would not have come to fruition without their assistance . I also owe thanks to readers Susan Sell and Nancy Gallagher, whose input helped sharpen the focus and clarify the needed revisions for a book. I am grateful to Mike Mochizuki for his close reading of the Japan chapter and his helpful suggestions. I began my graduate career as an East Asia specialist , and while the book is not East Asia–specific, it reflects many lessons learned about East Asia and comparative politics from my professors at George Washington University, in particular Bruce Dickson. In addition, it benefited greatly from the detailed comments of two anonymous reviewers, who offered excellent suggestions on both theory and case studies. The guidance of Peter Lavoy was instrumental in more theoretically sophisticated interpretation of case study data; I am indebted to him for his generous assistance. I also would like to thank the series editors, Gary Bertsch and Howard Wiarda, for their encouragement and advice. Earlier versions of this work were presented at the annual meetings of the...