The Federalist

The Federalist No. 32

[HAMILTON] The Federalist No. 32 199 The Federalist No. 32 ALEXANDER HAMILTON Januarys, 1788 To the People of the State of New York. ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences, which seem to be apprehended to the State Governments, from a power in the Union to controul them in the levies of money; because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the State Governments, and a conviction of the utility and necessity of local administrations, for local purposes, would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such a power: Yet I am willing here to allow in its full extent the justness of the reasoning, which requires that the individual States should possess an independent and uncontrolable authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants. And making this concession I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they would under the plan of the Convention retain that authority in the most absolute and unqualifiedsense ; and that an attempt on the part of the national Government to abridge them in the exercise of it would be a violent assumption of power unwarranted by any article or clause of its Constitution. An intire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty would imply an intire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might remain in them would be alFrom The Independent Journal, January 2, 1788. The original essay also appeared on January 3 in The'Daily Advertiser, on January 4 in The New-York Packet, and on January 8 in The New-York Journal. It was numbered 31 in the newspapers, and in the McLean edition it was divided into two parts (of which this is the first) and numbered 32 and 33. 1 {31} zoo The Federalist No. 32 [HAMILTON] together dependent on the general will. But as the plan of the Convention aims only at a partial Union or consolidation, the State Governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had and which were not by that act exclusively delegated to the United States. This exclusive delegation or rather this alienation of State sovereignty would only exist in three cases; where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant. I use these terms to distinguish this last case from another which might appear to resemble it; but which would in fact be essentially different; I mean where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional interferences in the policy of any branch o£ administration, but would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional authority. These three cases of exclusive jurisdiction in the Fcederal Government may be exemplified by the following instances: The last clause but one in the 8th section of the ist. article provides expressly that Congress shall exercise "exclusive legislation" over the district to be appropriated as the seat of government. This answers to the first case. The first clause of the same section impowers Congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises" and the ad. clause of the loth, section of the same article declares that "no State shall without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports except for the purpose of executing its inspection laws." Hence would result an exclusive power in the Union to lay duties on imports and exports with the particular exception mentioned ; but this power is abriged by another clause which declares that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State; in consequence of which qualification it now only ex- [HAMILTON] The Federalist No. 32 201 tends to the duties on imports. This answers to the second case. The third will be found in that clause, which declares that Congress shall have power "to establish an UNIFORM RULE of naturalization throughout the United States." This must necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a DISTINCT RULE there could be no...