The Federalist

The Federalist No. 29

[HAMILTON] The Federalist No. 29 181 The Federalist No. 29 [35] ALEXANDER HAMILTON January 9, 1788 To the People of the State of New York. THE power of regulating the militia and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defence, and of watching over the internal peace of the confederacy. It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the public defence. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert; an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army: And it would fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions, which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confidingthe regulation of the militia to the direction of the national authority. It is therefore with the most evident propriety that the plan of the Convention proposes to empower the union "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed byCongress." From The Independent Journal, January 9, 1788. This essay appeared on January 10 in The Daily Advertiser, on January 11 in The New-York Packet, and on January 12 in The New-York Journal. It was numbered 29 in the McLean edition and 35in the newspapers. 182 The Federalist No. 29 [HAMILTON] Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposi- - a tion to the plan of the Convention, there is none that was so little to have been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the 3 one from which this particular provision has been attacked. If a well regulated militia be the most natural defence of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, 4 an efficacious power over the militia, in the body to whose care 5 the protection of the State is committed, ought as far as possible to take away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the fcederal government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with' the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary will be a more certain method of preventing its existence than a thousand prohibitions upon paper. In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute the Laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is no where any provision in the proposed Constitu6 tion for calling out the POSSE COMITATUS to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty; whence it has been inferred that military force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very favourable opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the next that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. The latter fortunately is as much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt that a right to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute its declared powers would include that of re- [HAMILTON] The Federalist No. 29 183 quiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be entrusted with the execution of those laws; as it would be to believe that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would...