Florida and the Mariel Boatlift of 1980: The First Twenty Days

1. The Origins of Castro and the Cuban Revolution

1 The Origins of Castro and the Cuban Revolution The Cuban revolutionary process that began with Fulgencio Batista’s coup d’état against Cuba’s constitutional president in 1952 was, at least until 1959, a popu­ lar uprising against the prototypical patriarchal Latin Ameri­can dictator. Po­liti­ cal, rather than economic and structural, factors were behind the emergence of revolutionary politics (del Águila 1984, 39). According to a 1956 government analy­ sis (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1956, 4), Cuba was “the most heavily capitalized country in Latin America,” and its “networks of railways and highways blanket[ed] the country.” Cuba’s rates of investment and capital formation (15 to 18 percent) were of­ten higher than those of many industrially developed countries. The rapidly expanding middle class included “an impressive class of entrepreneurs,” while 23 percent of the working class was classified as skilled (23). Salaried workers received 66 percent of the national income (sec­ ond highest in Latin America). This was reflected in the acquisition of consumer goods, in which Cuba was virtually unmatched in Latin America. It ranked first in ownership of televisions and sec­ ond in cars, telephones, and radios (Marrero 1987, 19–20). Cuba also had one of the “highest nutritional standards in Latin America” and “comparatively high rankings in terms of social delivery,” which made possible the lowest infant mortality rate (32/1,000) in the region. The island ranked third in the number of physicians, had a life expectancy of close to 60 years, and enjoyed a literacy rate of nearly 80 percent, considerably above the Latin Ameri­ can rate of around 50 percent (del Águila, 1984, 40). By the late 1950s, less than 40 percent of Cubans lived in the countryside or were engaged in rural activities—among the lowest averages in Latin America (Illán 1964, 33). Despite significant differences between urban and rural areas (due partly to large seasonal unemployment among sugar workers), only a very small minority of rural workers was engaged in subsistence agriculture. Moreover, Cuba did not suffer from the “feudal peonage” problem that was present in much of Latin America. While sugar was still pivotal in terms of exports, its participation in 4 • Chapter 1 the overall economy had been reduced by the growth of manufacturing (25 percent of the national income in 1954) and achievements in agricultural diversification (in 1957, Cuba produced 75 percent of the food it consumed). Thus, while Cuba was still mostly a one-­ crop exporter (though increasingly less so), it was not a one-­ crop economy. All of these statistics indicate that “although inequalities in the social structure and distortions affected the pattern of economic development, neither the dual society nor the classic underdevelopment models applied to Cuban society” (Marrero 1987, 28). In 1952, months before presidential elections, Batista, a candidate well behind in the polls, led a successful coup, promising to end the corruption and gang-­related violence that permeated the Auténtico administrations and to hold future elections. Batista was not a newcomer to Cuban politics. He had been a major player since the days of the frustrated 1933 revolution.1 As head of the military, Batista ruled Cuba behind weak presidents from the end of the 1933 revolution to 1940, when he allowed a constitutional convention of all Cuban po­ liti­ cal groups (in­ clud­ ing communists) to produce a surprisingly progressive constitution.2 Afterward, Cuba experienced a period of constitutional rule that lasted until 1952 and included three administrations: that of Batista (1940–1944), whose coalition benefited from the “broad front” collaboration of the communists during World War II, and the presidential terms of President Ramón Grau (1944–1948) and Carlos Prío (1948–1952), both representing the Auténtico Party, a social democratic party representing the nationalist social democratic ideals of the 1933 revolution. While most civil society groups and the two main parties, the Auténtico and the Ortodoxo (recently created by disillusioned Auténticos who promised to clean up Cuban politics), sought a negotiated way out for Batista after the 1952 coup, others plotted insurrection. On July 26, 1953, Fidel Castro, a relatively unknown Ortodoxo, led an unsuccessful 150-­man attack on the Moncada army barracks without his party’s authorization. Dozens died and Castro, although captured and sentenced to 15 years in prison, managed to obtain some national attention. The following year Batista held elections, but his control of the electoral board led his main opponent, Dr. Grau San Martín...