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6 “Any Man Is Lucky That Comes Out Yet Alive” The Battle of Gettysburg The morning of July 1, 1863, dawned hot and humid atop South Mountain. By first light, the Army of Northern Virginia was already on the march, with R. H. Anderson’s troops taking the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg. E. A. Perry’s brigade, commanded by Col. David Lang while the general recuperated from a bout with typhoid fever, served as the army’s rear guard. The Eighth Florida drew the unenviable task of eating the dust of Lee’s forces while tagging along in the back with the wagon train. A few showers sprang up during the day, but the rain did little except briefly settle the dirt.1 With the sure intuition of veteran troops, the graycoats seemed to know a battle was brewing.They had confidence in their generals, and past history had proven that they could defeat the Army of the Potomac, even against long odds. A Floridian summed up the feelings of Gen. Lee’s Confederates. “[Our] army was full of life and confidence, flushed with recent victories, though we had been on the march for more than a month in all kinds of weather except cold, and part of the time marching day and night on short rations, foot sore, ragged, and some barefoot, [we remained] jovial and in good health, good rifles, and plenty of ammunition, we thought we could whip Meade’s army and capture the city of Washington.”2 At the foot of South Mountain, Anderson halted his division near the township of Cashtown. Anderson noted: “Shortly before our arrival at Cashtown, the sound of brisk cannonading near Gettysburg announced an engagement in our front.” They waited there an hour before Dick Anderson received orders from A. P. Hill to bring his division forward, and after summoning the Floridians from the rear, Anderson and his troops headed toward the sound of the engagement. The corps commander assigned Anderson’s men to hold the high 66 / Chapter 6 ground along Herr Ridge, filling a gap in the line left when Hill had directed Maj. Gen. Dorsey Pender’s division into the fight. There they waited through the first day of the battle of Gettysburg.3 One of Perry’s men recorded that they “had one or two little skirmishes with the enemy,” but they must have been very minor indeed, as no mention has been uncovered from other sources. Another recalled: “We reached the battlefield on the 1st day’s fight at dark and took position in line of battle at the center of the army and just to the right of town where we lay under heavy fire until the next day.”4 Around dawn on July 2, Dick Anderson moved his division southeast to Seminary Ridge. James B. Johnson, the adjutant of the Fifth Florida, wrote that “July 2nd was a cloudless day and the heat was intense.” The Florida brigade spent the morning waiting impatiently for the inevitable attack. Johnson recounted: “We knew there was desperate fighting ahead of us and [the men] chafed at the delay. Some of the men spent the time in playing cards.”5 Gen. Lee decided to try an en echelon assault upon the Union left flank on July 2. This method of attack, favored by many Civil War generals, called for a series of brigades to charge, one after another, along the enemy’s line of defenses . In theory, the advantage of the en echelon assault derived from the natural tendency of the generals being assailed to call for reinforcements, thus allowing later attackers to hit a weak spot or gap and break the line. In reality, this type of attack seldom worked as planned, but Lee’s confidence in his army made him willing to take the risk.6 The Union commander had made the most of the terrain in forming his army’s defensive position. Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard’s XI Corps occupied the northern section of the Federal line, just east of the junction of the EmmitsburgTaneytown roads; Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock’s II Corps held the center; and Meade had directed Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles to connect his III Corps to Hancock’s left, extending the Cemetery Ridge line to Little Round Top. Sickles instead moved his troops into the rolling ground fronting the Emmitsburg Road. The arrogant general almost cost Meade the battle. Historian Harry W. Pfanz described the situation as...

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