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5 “The Green and Pleasant Valley of Pennsylvania” The Route to Gettysburg Almost before the smoke cleared at Chancellorsville, Gen. Robert E. Lee set in motion plans for the invasion of Pennsylvania. He had apparently contemplated such a move for several months. In February he had directed Jedediah Hotchkiss, a Northern-born engineer and Stonewall Jackson’s cartographer, to prepare a map of the Shenandoah Valley, including routes to Harrisburg and Philadelphia.1 Despite some official misgivings regarding the safety of Richmond, by June 1, 1863, Jefferson Davis reluctantly gave final approval for the incursion into the Keystone State. Lee shared the chief executive’s concerns about the Confederate capital but felt compelled to undertake the gamble.2 The commander of the Southern army could offer myriad reasons to invade Maryland or Pennsylvania. First, the chance to forage for supplies in Pennsylvania ’s rich valleys served the dual purposes of resupplying his troops and allowing Virginia’s beleaguered farmers an opportunity to plant and harvest a crop. Second, a victory near Washington might relieve pressure on Vicksburg and the Army of Tennessee, while also encouraging a growing peace movement in the North. Third, the Confederacy still hoped such a victory might even now lead to recognition by one or more of the European powers.More important , Lee believed that he had only two real options—“retire to Richmond and stand a siege, which must ultimately . . . end in surrender, or . . . to invade Pennsylvania.”3 After gaining Davis’s approval for the campaign, the Confederate commander ’s first problem involved withdrawing his army from Fredericksburg, while holding Fighting Joe Hooker’s numerically superior army in place. He decided upon a simple plan. Lee proposed pulling James Longstreet’s and 58 / Chapter 5 Richard S. Ewell’s corps out of line, a division at a time, while leaving A. P. Hill’s soldiers in position near Fredericksburg to keep the Army of the Potomac pinned along the Rappahannock. The Confederate commander directed Hill to make “such dispositions as will be calculated to deceive the enemy, and keep him in ignorance of any change in the disposition of [the Confederate] army.” If Hooker attempted to follow Longstreet and Ewell, Hill was to pursue him. If the Federals threw a large force across the Rappahannock, the Third Corps was to retreat south along the right-of-way of the Richmond, Fredericksburg, & Potomac Railroad.4 On the morning of June 3, Lee began his withdrawal. Hooker almost immediately learned that the Rebel troops were leaving their positions along the west bank of the Rappahannock. He incorrectly assumed that the graycoats were trying to turn his right flank or attempting to cut him off from Washington ’s strong defenses. Weighing his options quickly, the Union commander concluded that he could best disrupt the Confederate plan by striking across the Rappahannock.5 The first engagement of the Gettysburg campaign began late in the afternoon of June 5, and the Florida brigade suffered the first casualties. Under protection of an intense artillery barrage, which a Union soldier claimed “might almost have been heard in Vermont,” engineers of Maj. Gen. Sedgwick’s VI Corps pushed two pontoon bridges across the Rappahannock near the mouth of Deep Run. The Second Florida, posted as pickets along the south bank of the river, vigorously contested the incursion. Maj.Wesley Brainerd, an engineer with the Fiftieth New York, recalled: “One after another of my men dropped down and attempted to crawl away, some men hit in the arms, some in the body, others in the legs.” The Floridians, a soldier of the Thirteenth Massachusetts Regiment informed a friend,“were pretty stubborn about our crossing, but after being peppered awhile with Artillery, they gave way.” A Mississippian located on the bluffs overlooking the river plain observed the action. He noted in his diary that the bluecoats charged “with bands playing and much cheering. . . . [They] drove in our pickets and crossed at Deep Run. Constant skirmishing. A few of our men captured.” Lt. William Penn Pigman of Co. H of the Eighth Florida recorded: “The Second Regt was on picket and the Yankees made the attack[—]threw over a regiment or two & took 62 prisoners, 4 officers, 58 privates , 3 killed & 2 wounded.”6 Despite the ease with which Union troops established the bridgehead near Deep Run, Hooker failed to capitalize on his advantage. One reason for the inactivity involved the Florida prisoners. They apparently convinced their cap- Route to Gettysburg / 59 tors that the troop movements that...

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