Opening the Doors: The Desegregation of the University of Alabama and the Fight for Civil Rights in Tuscaloosa

8. Boone versus Bull: June 6–10, 1963

chapter 8 Boone versus Bull June 6–10, 1963 If we have violence, it will have been brought on by George Wallace. While Governor Wallace began offering his views on desegregation, so too didtheAlabamaStateLegislature.Inaslightdeparturefrombusinessasusual, onFriday,June7,thelegislaturegaveupanysemblanceofaneutralstanceand instead adopted a resolution “expressing its good wishes and prayers for Gov. Wallace in his promised stand next Tuesday against desegregation of the University of Alabama.” The state senate also made its allegiance clear—­ offering a silent prayer for its governor. “It was an unusual moment,” admitted the new­ spapers, though in Alabama, the separation of church and state was of­ ten viewed more as a suggestion than a rule. For most, the eventual desegregation of the university appeared to be a foregoneconclusion,thoughnotforGovernorWallace—atleastnotpublicly. In an editorial published just days prior to the stand, Buford Boone wrote: “Governor Wallace knows that regardless of what he does, and regardless of what any one else in this state may do, Negro students will be registered at the University and will attend. That leaves only the question of whether integration will be carried out peacefully, or whether rioting will occur.” His editorial continued: “We believe his ‘last stand’ decision to be foolish and un- 68 The Stand necessary. But we support strongly his intention to go about the proceeding peacefully.” The newspaper editor was attempting the same trick he’d pulled off during the Lucy riots years earlier—making it clear that the press was willing to take sides, commending or vilifying as necessary. “If we have violence,” Boone added, “it will have been brought on by George Wallace.” Despite his criticism, Boone appreciated Wallace’s promise to maintain order—a lofty yet reasonable goal that would serve as the litmus test for the limits of the governor’s power. While the success of Wallace’s plan had yet to be determined, the mere promise for peace was far more than Governor Barnett had offered the previous fall at Ole Miss. Wallace’s clear stance against violence played a criti­ cal role in assuring that there was none. With his wide reach and the ears of many, the former Golden Gloves boxer had little trouble throwing his weight around in an effort to ensure a particular outcome. Still, even with his safeguards in place and the support of the people, Wallace remained aware that he, too, was taking a calculated risk. If the desegregation of the University of Alabama ended in violence, not only would it be a pub­ lic relations disaster for the state and university, but a referendum on Wallace as well. % Although he had recently losthispostas Birmingham’s commissioner of pub­ lic safety, on Thursday, June 6, the notorious segregationist Eugene “Bull” Connor held a private meeting with Governor Wallace. While reports noted that their conversation related to the possibility of Connor receiving a new post within the state bureaucracy, it is more than likely that the impending situation at the University of Alabama monopolized much of their conversation . Connor had gained notoriety just a month prior, in May of 1963, when he resorted to police dogs and fire hoses to combat Birmingham’s civil rights demonstrators. The sixty-­ five-­ year-­ old commissioner had a reputation for bending laws in an effort to enforce them, paying little attention to notions of police brutality or excessive force. On Friday, June 7, just a day after Wallace’s meeting with his former commissionerofpub ­licsafety,BullConnorservedasthegovernor’smouthpiece,speaking to White Citizens Council members at Tuscaloosa’s Holt High School Boone versus Bull 69 and relaying the message he’d likely been encouraged to transmit. Echo­ ing Wallace’spleaforpeopletosteerclearoftheuniversity,hereassuredthecrowd that desegregation could effectively be stopped “at the ballot box and by economic boycotts.” In a bit of skewed logic, Connor went on to claim that Attorney General Robert Kennedy would “give the world if we had trouble here,” and by keeping the peace, they could “beat the Kennedys at their own game.” “Youarenotgoingtowhiptheintegrationfightwithbricks,guns,orsticks, or in court—there is only one way left. That is economics.” He called for his audience to “do just as King is doing” and “boycott the devil” out of stores in open support of African Ameri­ can causes. Despitehisrhetoric,Connorremainedfullyawareoftheuphillbattlewith which he was faced, adding ominously, “This is going to get worse before it gets better.” Meanwhile, just miles away, Buford Boone continued his fight on another front—pounding out an editorial to be printed in...