In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Despite the optimism of imperial reformers in Spain and the enthusiasm of the creole elites in Central America, the Kingdom of Guatemala was not a propitious place for political experimentation as the ¤rst full year of constitutional order began in January 1813. In concert with viceregal of¤cials in neighboring Mexico, Captain General Bustamante had spent the previous year constructing a counterinsurgency state capable of withstanding internal and external challenges to Spanish rule, and the policies he implemented were not in accordance with the spirit of imperial reform then so popular within the Spanish Cortes, not to mention the Guatemalan oligarchy. From his perspective, however, these precautions were necessary. At the time, the isthmus remained under the shadow of the full-blown Morelos insurgency in New Spain, a threat that was signi¤cant enough to cause Bustamante to begin stationing troops in western Guatemala at the end of 1812. Considering the events of the previous year, he also had no reason to assume that the revolts within Central America had been completely suppressed. Even without active unrest against Spanish authorities or clear signs of subversion, denunciations and arrests continued, while destabilizing rumors ran rampant throughout the countryside in the absence of solid news and good communications. In this environment, it would have been out of character for the military-oriented Bustamante to consider, however brie®y, the type of power sharing and political reform envisioned by the 6 The Challenge of the Constitution, 1813–1814 Constitution of 1812. Even if the captain general were not ideologically opposed to such a complete deconstruction of the system of enlightened absolutism that governed the empire at the height of the Bourbon period, his experience in colonial administration made him overly cautious about the viability of the liberal experiments during this critical time in the kingdom’s history. In a report to the Council of Regency dated 3 March 1813, Bustamante presented his analysis of the political trends in Central America to that point. According to the captain general, the growing pretension of the creole elite to political power was the greatest challenge to the preservation of the colony, aside from the external threat posed by the Morelos rebellion. After two years in Central America, Bustamante argued that “the spirit of oligarchy is what has dominated these provinces.”1 In his mind, the autonomy that the creoles demanded and that the constitution appeared to offer was actually a cover for independence, a drive to achieve the political hegemony that had been denied them up to then. Therefore, a rapid and complete implementation of the new system, with its constitutional ayuntamientos and regional legislative assemblies , would only speed the process whereby Guatemala would break with Spain. Bustamante proceeded to make the case that the Spanish authorities on the isthmus faced a concerted and coordinated attack by creoles acting through the institution of the ayuntamiento. He dated the ¤rst serious challenge to Spanish rule to 1809, when the municipal council of Ciudad Real overthrew the acting intendant of Chiapas, José Mariano Valero, and installed one of their own in the vacated of¤ce, a “sad example which with small variations has been blindly followed in other areas.”2 In his view the reaction from Captain General González had been too conciliatory and had inadvertently contributed to the growing belief on the isthmus that power “should be in the hands of ayuntamientos or juntas comprised of individuals chosen by them.”3 By the end of 1810, the ayuntamiento of Guatemala City had codi¤ed this perspective in the Instrucciones it prepared for Deputy Larrazábal, a document that, according to Bustamante, urged local (that is, junta) authority over police, taxes, commerce, industry, agriculture, defense, and the treasury, as well as power over nominations to imperial of¤ces and the title of grande (excelencia) for ayuntamientos. In this version of events, the creChallenge of the Constitution 149 ole elites, excited by the promise of autonomy and hoping to take advantage of the weakness of the imperial system, attempted to enlist Captain General González in a golpe de estado immediately before the arrival of Bustamante. The plot failed, but it was reproduced at the provincial level by the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan uprisings at the end of 1811 and the revolt in Tegucigalpa in January 1812.4 While he managed to suppress this unrest through his policies of careful vigilance and prudent conciliation , Bustamante argued that he found himself confronted by an increasingly recalcitrant ayuntamiento in the capital...

Share