In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

7 Reformation A New KMAG Trains an Army, Summer 1951–Summer 1952 Reform of the south Korean army began with a small step in May 1951 when van fleet requested the assignment of Brig. Gen. Cornelius e. Ryan as the chief of KMAG. van fleet recognized KMAG was the right tool for the job of RoKA reform, but it had become dull from disuse, and farrell was unable to generate the enthusiasm required. van fleet intended to grant Ryan wide latitude while exercising greater influence and cooperation with KMAG than his predecessors had done.The ripple effects of this move were decisive. Ryan transformed KMAG into a first-class military training and advisory mission. Under his experienced direction, KMAG then inaugurated a series of training and organizational reforms that laid the basis for a Korean army capable of fighting the Chinese on more equal terms. As American operations no longer focused on a military victory, and as the Chinese focused their efforts to rebuild their exhausted combat units, both sides generally considered that they faced a new kind of war. A war of posts—static lines of entrenched positions facing off across “no man’s land”— tended to dominate ground combat,while various UnC air campaigns,seeking some abstract pressure point, struggled in an inconclusive battle of logistical interdiction.1 even Ridgway, the aggressive former commander of eighth Army, acknowledged a reordering of military objectives when he wrote,“But the negotiations were just an extension of the battlefield . . .and it was the bitter task of the soldier to impress the enemy with our ability to resist all his efforts to move the battle line farther south” (emphasis added).2 Ridgway’s view of the purpose of ground combat implies the acceptance of a new reality that the war would not end in victory or in a settlement forced upon the Chinese and north Koreans. But,Ridgway’s assertion was made long after the fact.his optimistic expectation of a quick settlement colored his perceptions regarding the ground tactical situation.van fleet wanted to seize the initiative and exploit eighth Army’s advantages in mobility and firepower to deal the enemy a punishing blow and thereby make him more pliant at the truce tent at Kaesong. van 178 / Chapter 7 fleet’s staff drew up ambitious plans involving amphibious landings and limited offensives.not sure of what the final settlement would dictate,Ridgway felt it unwise to expend lives for ground that might have to be surrendered in a cease-fire deal. Consequently, a disappointed van fleet had to settle for elbowing forward along the iron Triangle and around the “Punchbowl .”3 The fighting was tough, but van fleet’s limited attacks gained time and space, even if the enemy found sanctuary to lick his wounds. Reflecting his mandate to retrain, reorganize, and expand the RoKA’s capabilities, he wrote to the army chief of staff J. lawton Collins, “i plan to supervise the RoK Army through three principal departments of KMAG: one will be schools and basic training; another will be field training of units up to division size; and the third will be RoK Army frontline operations.”4 This was an expansive mission statement, but van fleet’s trust in his new KMAG chief was well placed. Under Ryan’s direction and supervision, KMAG’s accomplishments were timely and long overdue. The Koreans finally began producing a crop of competent leaders and trained soldiers at scheduled intervals as programs for officer training expanded and improved. individual replacement (basic) training received parallel attention and reform . A new field training command was established in the summer of 1951 to retrain RoKA divisions in modern combat skills,resulting in every RoK division being refitted, refilled with replacements, and retrained under realistic conditions. Ryan’s personal relationship with van fleet gave KMAG new clout with the eighth Army and permitted it to acquire more experienced officers as advisors,particularly at the various training commands and at the corps and division levels.Their influence was felt most strongly in 1952 as Chinese and Korean troops sparred in the mountains of central and eastern Korea.Ryan also developed strong relations with his RoK counterparts, lee Chong-chan and Paik sun-yup, both reform minded and capable officers .Together, they authored the plans to make a new army. van fleet was professionally gratified with the progress of both KMAG and the RoKA from July 1951 to september 1952. in May 1951 he had expressed dismay at...

Share