Strike From the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1910-1945

14. A Deadly Efficiency: Anglo-American Air Support in Western Europe

14 A Deadly Efficiency: Anglo-American Air Support in Western Europe Preparations for Overlord, and the Gotterdammerung of the Luftwaffe Allied planning for the invasion of Europe occupied over two years, and in that planning, the role of air power came under profound scrutiny. In August 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had given their approval to the general tactical plan for the invasion, dubbed Overlord. In February 1944, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed command of the European theater, and to him would fall the heavy responsibility of carrying off this "1066 in reverse." Eisenhower succinctly summarized both the goals and the outcome of the invasion: Our main strategy in the conduct of the ground campaign was to land amphibious and airborne forces on the Normandy coast between Le Havre and the Cotentin Peninsula and, with the successful establishment of a beachhead with adequateports, to drive along the lines ofthe Loire and the Seine rivers into the heart of France, destroying the German strength and freeing France. We anticipated that the enemy would resist strongly on the line of the Seine and later on the Somme, but once ourforces had broken through the relatively static lines of the bridgehead at Saint-Lo and inflicted on him the heavy casualties in the Falaise Pocket, his ability to resist in France was negligible. Thereafter our armies swept east and north in an unimpeded advance which brought them to the German frontier and the defenses of the Siegfried Line.87 From the outset of Overlord planning, Eisenhower and the rest of the combined forces planners recognized that air power would be critical. The last thing planners wished to face was hostile air power over the 188 The Second World War 189 battlefront. During the Dieppe raid, the Luftwaffe and Royal Air Force had grappled in the air as Canadian soldiers fought and died in an illconceived "reconnaissance in force." The RAP took heavy losses, but managed to prevent the Luftwaffe from attacking the embattled Canadians . But the requirement to ensure air superiority over Dieppe resulted in the RAP having insufficient air assets to itself participate in the land battle. Obviously, such a situation could not exist during Overlord; the Luftwaffe would have to be destroyed, but not at the price of sacrificing vitally needed air support missions for air superiority ones. Fortunately, circumstances in early 1944 indicated that the Luftwaffe was on the skids. By the fall of 1943, Republic P-47 Thunderbolts equipped with long-range external fuel tanks lcalled drop tanks, because they could be used and then jettisoned before entering combat) were inflicting heavy losses on German fighters over Occupied Europe and to the German periphery. Then, in December 1943, the North American P-51B Mustang entered service. Featuring superlative handling qualities and aerodynamic design, and powered by a Rolls-Royce Merlin engine, the P-51B land its successors, the P-51C and P-51D) could escort bomber strikes to Berlin and back, thanks in part to a symmetrical wing section that was thick enough to house a large quantity of fuel and streamlined enough to minimize drag. What really should be remembered is less the relative contributions of these two fine aircraft and, instead, an overall truth of the strategic bombing effort: whatever else it may have accomplished-or failed to accomplish, for that matter-its primaryvalue to the Allied causewas as an aerial magnet that drew up the Luftwaffe to be destroyed by the American fighter force.88 The omnipresent Thunderbolts and Mustangs land less frequently P-38 Lightnings) gave the Luftwaffe no respite over Germany, complementing the shorter-legged Spitfires and Hawker Typhoons and Tempests of the Royal Air Force. Between January and June 1944-the five months before D-day-the Luftwaffe was effectively destroyed: 2262 German fighter pilots died during that time. In May alone, no less than 25 percent of Germany's total fighter pilot force Iwhich averaged 2283 at anyone time during this period) perished. Big Week, an air operation more precisely called Argument, targeted the German aircraft industry for special treatment; while production continued Isomething that has been overemphasized and taken out of the context of the entire air war effort in postwar accounts), the fighter force took staggering losses. In March 1944, fully 56 percent of the available German fighters were lost, dipping to 43 percent in April las the bomber 190 STRIKE FROM THE SKY effort switched to...