Strike From the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1910-1945

11. The Blitzkrieg

11 The Blitzkrieg The Invasion of Poland On September I, 1939, Hider's forces attacked Poland, triggering the outbreak of a general European war that had smoldered since the unsatisfactory peace of Versailles twenty years before. As mentioned in Part Three, the Luftwaffe's basic prewar orientation was strategic rather than tactical, but in Poland (as in Spain) it was called upon to perform largely in the tactical role. Very quickly, despite the stunning series of victories that marked the Polish campaign, both the Luftwaffe and the German Army recognized that significant problems existed that affected the outcome of air-land operations. For example, no common radio frequencies were assigned to air and land units--a generic problem, it would seem, to virtually all nations that have a history of air-land operations. Liaison problems between air and land commanders generated confusion about the location of friendly units (as did the rapid pace of German ground advance, which tended to go beyond pre-briefed map demarcations ), resulting in friendly casualties from misplaced air strikes. Not surprisingly-and again a lesson that would be discovered by the Allies themselves in subsequent fighting-batdefield air support proved most useful when applied to fixed fortifications and emplacements, and in attacks upon the enemy's rear areas (true batdefield air interdiction). When friendly forces were advancing at speed, air support became more haphazard, less coherent, less effective, and more likely to generate friendly casualties. F. W. von Mellenthin, a General Staff officer (and subsequendya Generalmajor) had a notable experience during the Polish campaign that reflected such problems: 131 132 STRIKE FROM THE SKY Very early in the campaign I learned how "jumpy" even a well-trained unit can beunderwar conditions. Alow-flying aircraftcircledovercorpsbattleheadquarters and everyone let fly with whatever he could grab. An air-liaison officer ran about trying to stop the fusillade and shouting to the excited soldiery that this was a German command plane-one of the good old Fieseler Storche ["Storks," a light short-takeoff and -landing aircraft]. Soon afterwards the aircraft landed, and out stepped the Luftwaffe general responsible for our close air support. He failed to appreciate the joke.4 On the whole, of course, German air support of the army during the Polish campaign was spectacularly successful, which reflected in great measure upon the organizational genius of Generalmajor Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen. Von Richthofen, while Fliegerfiihrer (Air leader) of the so-called Nahkampfverband z.b.V. ("close battle association for special duties" discussed in Part Three, subsequently VIII Fliegerkorps), had drawn on his experiences in Spain and, recognizing the special challenge of ensuring effective cooperation between air and armored forces, had arranged to assign air liaison officers to specially equipped command cars-usually modified eight-wheel armored carsoperating at the apex of armored thrusts. Germany's attack on Poland involved a pincer assault by northern forces (Heeresgruppe Nord comprised of the 3d Corps, and the 3d and 4th Armies), and three southern armies (Heeresgruppe Sud consisting of the 8th, 10th, and 14thArmies). Von Richthofen's forces, really a tactical air force consisting of fighter, dive bomber, attack aircraft, and recce aircraft, supported the drive into Poland of the 10th Army, which thrust north of the Carpathian Mountains toward Lublin, then hooked north behind Lodz toward the confluence of the Bzura and Vistula rivers. Much as Heinz Guderian would do later in the French campaign, the German 10th Army, led by General Walther von Reichenau, punched through Polish defenses with a coordinated air-land assault, and then roamed virtually at will in Polish rear areas, rolling up Polish forces toward the Bzura. The pincer of Heeresgruppen Nord und Sud eventually trapped the Polish army between the Vistula and Bzura rivers around Kutno, the ring tightened, and on September 19,100,000 troops (representing the disorganized remains of nineteen divisions) surrendered to the German 8th Army. During these operations, Stuka dive bombers concentrated their attacks against Polish fortifications and rear areas, while Henschel Hs 123 attack biplanes furnished battlefield support , often operating from forward air strips-which, in reality, were usually any flat, clear stretch of ground "verified" as being suitable for The Second World War 133 aircraft operations by driving an automobile across it at speeds up to 30 mph! The Hs 123's proved surprisingly effective, and though already out of production, remained in service as a result of the Polish (and subsequent French) experience with...