Strike From the Sky: The History of Battlefield Air Attack, 1910-1945

9. The Spanish Legacy

9 The Spanish Legacy Lessons Read and Misread Writing just after the outbreak of the Second World War, Spanish war veteran Ferdinand Miksche perceptively stated: The air force has become the hammer of modern warfare on land. Employed in close co-ordination with tanks, motorized infantry, and other ground forces it can bring battle to swift development. The great mobility of aircraft enables the attacker, because he holds the initiative, to seize almost at a flash the mastery of the air over the battlefield. Aviation gives modern land battle a third dimension: height. Forcesno longerfight for surfaces, limited tolengthand breadth; modern battle is the fight for cubic space.48 Miksche generously illustrated his argument with examples from the Spanish Civil War, which he had experienced first-hand. But Miksche was an unusually perceptive commentator, and his views of war were certainly not shared by all military experts, particularly since the confusion often inherent in the Spanish Civil War generated a number of lessons misunderstood. For example, in the wake of the Spanish Civil War, almost as much confusion existed over the role of aviation and armored forces in battle as had existed before it began. Tom Wintringham , another popular military commentator who had served with the International Brigades, wrote: By 1938 ... air power had become capable of taking over a large share of the functions of artillery. In particular it would take over the function of supporting tanks and motorized infantry. As a flying artillery, planes could do what guns used to do in Napoleon's hands: blast open a breach in the enemy's position for 109 110 STRIKE FROM THE SKY decisive manoeuvre. From 1938 it was clear that the dive-bomber was the best type of plane for this decisive function.49 Yet French Gen. Maurice Duval, interpreting "lessons" learned in Spain, saw no such decisive role for air powerj to him, air attack was at best only a supplement to artillery. Writing of the Cadenaform of attack, he stated that it is not in doubt whether the cannon is the more superior to the airplane for the execution of attack preparation. It places its projectives on the objective with an exactitude unknown to lithe chain," and at much less risk. liThe chain" cannot substitute for nor justify an insufficiency of artillery.50 It is this aspect of the Spanish Civil War that is most interesting: intelligent, well-informed critics could reach often diametrically opposite conclusions, or, interpreting data correctly, nevertheless reach a flawed conclusion. Wintringham, for example, was largely correct in his analysis of air power by 1938. But the dive bomber, except under very special circumstances-namely under the mantle of protective air cover or under conditions where enemy air opposition was not a factorproved far from ideal for battlefield support. For his part, Duval was essentially correct in recognizing that air power, on its own, could not win battles. But in combination with other arms-infantry, artillery, and armor-it generated a tremendous synergy for both offensive and defensive warfare (though, as Miksche pointed out, it had particular value for the attacker). It might be said that critics took away from the Spanish war what they wished to believe, and they searched its lessons carefully to selectively acquire supporting data for their own particular viewpoint. Certainly, for example, the vulnerability of the unescorted bomber was a lesson that all the European nations-and the United States as well-should have clearly learned. Oddly, Italy alone among the Spanish combatants devoted negligible attention to the war, paying for this folly in the war to come. France, Germany, and Russia paid greater attention, looking for clues to the future. France France seriously misread some of the lessons of the Spanish Civil War, notably the value of integrated air-land operations in maneuver warfare. Then, there were political problems within France that mitigated against the country developing a realistic defense strategy. Pierre Cot, Abyssinia, Spain, and War in Asia 111 Leon Blum's aviation minister (and a man fond of quoting Robispierre, arguably one of the fathers of modern terrorism), recognized the value of attack aircraft, particularly in an antiarmor role, and sought the advice of Soviet military aviation experts to create the first French parachute airborne assault and ground-attack units. He wanted a balanced air force in which attack aircraft would have represented 16 percent of the total combat force, but the collapse...