Air Power and Armies

CONTENTS

CONTENTS PART I. AIR SUPERIORITY I. THE OBJECT The object of an air force in a land campaign-definition of a land campaignconfusion of thought about air superiority-definition-air superiority is method, not intention-apparent divergence between war aims of army and air forceexplanation . II. THE MAIN OFFENSIVE. II Examples of different degrees of air superiority in Great War-the Palestine campaign-the Somme-the two main principles governing the fight for air superiority, the Main Offensive and the Supplementary Offensive-definition of the term 'vital centre'. Conduct of the Main Offensive-the stage of deadlock-the Germans thrown on the defensive in 1916-results ofone belligerent being thrown on the defensivediversion of aircraft from the decisive task-diversion from the decisive area-the attacker always on interior lines-results of the German attacks on England-need to exploit the capacity for diversion in order to gain air superiority at the decisive point. Air situation subject to variation-causes-exceptional cases requiring adoption of strategic defensive in the air-the relation of action against air forces to the air plan as a whole-method of approach to the problem. III. THE SUPPLEMENTARY OFFENSIVE. THE DESTRUCTION OR NEUTRALIZATION OF ENEMY AIR FORCES 31 The problem-a joint responsibility of bombers and fighters-refutation of the common claim that air forces can only be brought to action by consent-the 'Fleet-in-being' idea obsolete and inapplicable to air forces-principles governing the supplementary offensive-need for active and persistent offensive-offensive patrols over enemy aerodromes, or points of departure-offensive patrols at points of enemy destination-direct fighter co-operation with bombers over objectivesclose O.P.s over battle area. Low-fighter attack on aerodromes in co-operation with bombers-bombing of aerodromes-exceptional cases requiring adoption of tactical defensive in the air -air superiority in an opposed landing. Examination of these principles in more detail-the offensive policy-the Verdun experience-but need for intelligent direction-O.P.s over aerodromes not to become 'set piece', even offensive barrage patrols usually ineffective-exceptions -Messines-close blockade ofaerodromes-examples in France and Palestine. IV. THE SUPPLEMENTARY OFFENSIVE (contd.) Escorts to bomber formations-disadvantages of single-seater fighters-need to turn to fight-and limited range-capacity of bombers on passage to look after themselves-fighters to meet bombers over objectives-conditions when bomber objectives out of fighter range-'scooping out'-case for the two-seater fighterbut some single-seaters always necessary. Bombing of aerodromes-experience in Independent Force-danger of underrating possible effects of bombing on aerodromes-British experience in last 16 CONTENTS months ofGreat War-Iessons-damage due to hangars getting burnt out-modern independence of hangars-need for dispersal of aircraft on aerodromes-results of overcrowding of aerodromes-the French experience-need for dispersal of aerodromes with fewer aircraft on each-the question of control-bombing of aircraft depots-British experience in France-lessons-facilities for replacement of casualties in aircraft-the time factor) results of bombing just before an important operation. PART II. THE SELECTION OF OBJECTIVES V. STRATEGIC CONCENTRATION 61 The principle ofconcentration-two main classes ofobjective, fighting troops and supply-definitions-supply includes production-relation between attack on production and more intimate forms of co-operation in the field-the moral effect of air action on the 'non-combatant' as a background to this chapter. The object of attack on production-definition of war industries-war industrial area5 of most European countries within air range offrontiers-effects of attack on production-lesson of German attacks on England-methods of attack on production -Foch's appreciation of 1915. The two opposing schools of thought about attack on production as opposed to intimate co-operation in the field-fundamental unsoundness of both-answer is mobility and concentration on whichever is most vital at the time-illustrated by history offormation of the Independent Force in 1915. Early attacks on German war industries-first conception of 'long-term' strategic possibilities of such attacks-creation of the Royal Air Force in April19lS-Sir F. Sykes as C.A.S.-situation on the Western Front at the time, the German spring offensives-Proposals for formation and command of Inter-Allied Bombing force -Trenchard assumes command of new Independent Force 6.vi.IS-Question of Inter-Allied Bombing force decided-Foch instructed to draw up programmeTrenchard 's views on the conditions in which bombing of Germany should be undertaken. Contemporary events at G.H.Q.-the recommendations of the Transportation experts as...