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X THE R.A.F. IN THE BATTLE (contd.) TACTICAL CONCENTRATION 'The Selection of a correct object demands knowledge and judgement to ensure that the resources which can be made available are sufficient for its attainment.'I THIS factor, which must, of course, be considered before it is possible to arrive at any plan, has not been dealt with earlier in this review because it is one which will repay examination in some detail. It may be admitted at once that the air forces which did in fact take part in the battle of Amiens would not have been sufficient for the attainment of the object which it has been suggested might have been set before the R.A.F. in that battle-in particular, a large number of additional fighters would have been required for low-flying attack. But the wording of the extract quoted above from the 1929 edition of the Field Service Regulations should be particularly noted in this connexion-'the resources which can be made available'. This brings us back at once to the key principle of all sound strategy, the principle of concentration, which the writer makes no excuse for again quoting in full: '(i) The principle ofconcentration: The application of this principle consists in the concentration and employment of the maximum force, moral, physical, and material, at the decisive time and place (whether that place be a strategical theatre or a tactical objective).' This is followed immediately by a second principle: '(ii) The principle of economy offorce. To economize strength, while compelling dissipation of that of the enemy, must be the constant aim of every commander. The application of this principle implies the use of the smallest forces for purposes ofsecurity, ofdiverting the enemy's attention or ofcontaining superior enemy strength, consistent with the attainment of the object in view. This principle is a necessary complement to the principle of concentration.' I F.S.R. ii, sect. 7. 2. THE R.A.F. IN THE BATTLE 183 It will, no doubt, be generally agreed that on August 8th the decisive place in the west was the British Fourth Army front. And the application of the principle of concentration, as illustrated by the British air concentration for the battle of Amiens, should be considered under four headings, closely interrelated : (a) The concentration of the maximum possible number of aircraft on the decisive task, that is to say againstobjectives directly connected with the attack by the Fourth Army; (b) The development ofthe maximum effort by the squadrons so concentrated; (c) The concentration ofthat effort upon the minimum number of objectives calculated to give effect to the object selected; and (d) Centralization of control, with a view to securing due co-ordination and the most economical application ofthe force available. In considering first the concentration ojsquadrons upon the decisive task, it is again necessary to remind the reader that in addition to the British squadrons a large number ofFrench air units took part in the battle, comprising not only the units of the French First Army but also those of the General Reserve which were allotted to support them. So that although it is only possible to make a detailed examination of the British figures-which will serve to bring out the point it is desired to emphasize-yet when comparing them with the German forces opposed to them it must not be forgotten that the Allies together disposed of a very much larger force than that of which the details are examined in the following paragraphs. It will be seen from Appendix C that the British air force in France on August 8th comprised 74 squadronsI with a total of 1,390 aircraft serviceable on charge-not counting the 20 army co-operation squadrons with which we are not here concerned. Included in the air concentration for the battle ofAmiens are the squadrons of the 5th (Fourth Army) Brigade, most of the 9th (G.H.Q. Reserve) Brigade, and all the 3rd (Third Army) Brigade, the inclusion ofthe latter being rather more favourable than is strictly justified, because by no means the whol~ effort J Two of these were American squadrons, equipped with British aircraft. [13.58.39.23] Project MUSE (2024-04-23 10:04 GMT) 184 THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, AUGUST 8TH-11TH, 1918 of the 3rd Brigade was occupied by the battle. So the disposition of the British air force in France on the crucial date can be summarized by classes as follows...

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