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PART III. THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, AUGUST 8TH-11TH, 1918: VIII. THE STORY OF THE BATTLE
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PART III THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, AUGUST 8TH11TH , 1918 VIII THE STORY OF THE BATTLEI THE SITUATION WHEN THE PLAN WAS CONCEIVED ON the 17th ofJuly 1918 Sir Henry Rawlinson, then commanding the Fourth British Army, was in his head-quarters at Flixecourt drafting a letter to Sir Douglas Haig, outlining and asking approval for a plan to attack with his army astride the Somme, with the object ofdisengaging the important strategical centre of Amiens. As he wrote, the waves of the last great German attack of the War were beating against the French defences south and east of Rheims; and Mangin's divisions were assembling in the woods between Compiegne and Villers Cotterets for the counter-stroke that at dawn next day was to mark the turn of the tide in the west. At the northern end of the allied line there were strong indications that yet another German offensive was imminent in the Lys sector, and in fact we now know that Ludendorff was staging an attack in that area for July 20th, though it was never launched, owing to the pressure ofAllied counter-offensives on other parts of the front. Two other factors in the general situation are relevant to this story. In the air the German aeroplane attacks on London had been finally abandoned in the face of the very powerful and highly organized system of passive defence; and although we had still to provide against the possibility of a renewal of these attacks, in fact no raid had crossed the British coast since May 19th. British counter-measures against German war industry had been initiated during the previous winter, and by July 1918 five bombing squadrons, the nucleus of the great InterAllied bombing force of the 1919 programme, were operating against the Rhineland from the Nancy area.2 1 See Map North-West Europe 1/250,000 G.S. G.S. 2733 Sheet 4, and Sketchmap 2 at the end of this volume. 2 A sixth squadron, No. 97, joined the force on August 9th, from England. THE STORY OF THE BATTLE 149 At sea the enemy submarine offensive had been definitely checked during the latter halfof 1917 by the adoption ofconvoy and the arrival of the American flotillas; and the menace had been still further diminished in the spring of 1918 by the minebarrages and the operations against the submarine bases on the Belgian coast. THE PLAN In accordance with directions issued by Sir Douglas Haig at an Army Commanders' conference earlier in the month, the Commander ofthe Fourth Army on the 17th ofJuly submitted his original plan for approval. This plan in its initial form was oflimited scope, and aimed atimportantbut definitely restricted strategical results. Its objects were to assure the safety of Amiens; to improve our position at itsjunction with the French, and from the point of view of ground for observation and defence; to shorten the line, and to strike a blow at the enemy morale, which was rightly assumed to be low after the failure of his Champagne offensive. The essentials on which the plan was based were firstly surprise and therefore secrecy; and secondly the method of attack by masses of tanks without artillery preparation, on the lines that had proved so effective and economical in life at Cambrai in the previous November, and more recently on a smaller scale in the Australian attack at Hamel early inJuly. (General Mangin was to give a further demonstration of the efficacy of these tactics at dawn the following morning on the Marne.) It was largely in order to make more sure of secrecy that General Rawlinson proposed that the attack should be made by the British alone, without the active co-operation of the French on his right. The scope of this plan received its first enlargement when Sir Douglas Haig-who was being pressed by General Foch to undertake an offensive in the north-extended it to embrace the active co-operation of the First French Army (General Debeney) which was placed by the Generalissimo under his orders for this operation. On July 29th Generals Rawlinson and Debeney were told that the object of the offensive was to disengage Amiens and the railway Amiens-Paris; and that when the line Mericourt-Hangest was secured the British Fourth Army keeping their left flank on the Somme were to [34.229.110.49] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 12:40 GMT) 150 THE BATTLE OF AMIENS, AUGUST 8TH-11TH, 1918 press the...