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CHAPTER IV. The Organization of Aerial Warfare
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CHAPTER IV The Organization of Aerial Warfare GENERAL OUTLINE IN 1910 I wrote: "Besides the technical question of weapons involved , aerial warfare also demands solution of the problems of preparation, organization, and utilization of aerial forces; that is, it calls for the creation, ex novo) of a third part of the art of war, the art of aerial warfare." 1 I believe that this statement today may meet with agreement by a consensus of opinion; and in compiling this study of the art of aerial warfare, I have been led to make it simply to point out the heights which aerial warfare may reach, and thus be given the importance it deserves, so that students of war would try to create the third branch of the art of war-aerial warfare. The problems involved are many and difficult; but they must be solved, for before forging an arm we must first know what we intend to do with it and how to use it. So far in this study I have merely tried to indicate, without making any pretense of solving the many problems involved, the character and scope of aerial warfare in general and to define the means necessary to actuate the Independent Air Force, fcrmulating as I went a few basic principles which I do not despair of having accepted. But even from the little I have said, it is evident that the establishment of an Independent Air Force requires an organization founded not on empiricism, but upon a comprehensive study of all those logistical dispositions necessary to operate it. While the strategic utilization of an Independent Air Force may result from wise application of a few basic principles, its tactical use requires an accurate theoretical and practical study of its armament and formation of its units. A study of aerial logistics or tactics would 1 I problem; dell aeronaviga1.ione, Rome, 1910. 69 The Command of The Air be out of place in this book. Instead I believe it timely to go a little deeper into its organization here, since it is with its organization that we must begin. And since the organizing of an Independent Air Force does not admit any flights of the imagination, I shall try to correlate to the best of my ability present and future needs. CO-ORDINATION The use of military, naval, and aerial forces in war should be directed toward a single end, to win. To attain maximum effectiveness these forces must be thoroughly co-ordinated and in harmony with one another. The three forces should function as ingredients-or factors-of a single product in which the best results can be obtained only by a proper apportioning of the ingredients used. The resources which even the richest nation can put at the disposal of national defenses are not limitless. With a given quantity of resources it is possible to secure a national defense just as efficient as the correct proportioning of the three factors. The more nearly just the proportions of these factors, the smaller will be the nation's expenditure for its national defense. But even when the three factors are so justly proportioned, the maximum results cannot be obtained unless they are perfectly co-ordinated. Allowing the greatest freedom of action to the respective commanders of the army, navy. and air forces. it would be in the interest of national defense to have the three branches of the service co-ordinated under a supreme authority. But even this is not enough. What is needed further is the proper subdivision and allocation of the resources destined for national defense where they can be most effective in war or any other eventuality. These considerations are so self-evident in nature that it would be superfluous to explain them further. It logically follows, then, that the following is what is needed to carry out the program: 1. An authoritative body to study the needs of national defense and to determine and allocate the proper proportions of national resources to the three branches of the service-land, sea, and air forces; and The Command of The Air 2. An authoritative body prepared to assume the Supreme Command of the three armed forces and co-ordinate their action. There are no such authoritative bodies in existence now. Instead the resources of the country allotted to national defense are now allocated by loose empirical methods, so that the proportion granted to each armed force is more a matter of happy combination of circumstances...