Outpost Kelly: A Tanker's Story

6. The Fight for Outpost Kelly

Sixteenth Day, 1400 Hours An after-action conference was called at 1400 hours for all company commanders and combat-support elements. We assembled in the Operations bunker. It was a somber gathering. This meeting was a critique, a review, of the assault. Lieutenant Colonel Roye opened the meeting by stating that 15th Regiment had directed that Outpost Kelly would be retaken. He was to attend a planning meeting at 1630 hours to examine the present situation and develop a new plan for the recovery of Outpost Kelly. Brigadier General Charles L. Dasher, Jr., assistant division commander, would be at the meeting. It was noted, for emphasis, that Lieutenant General J. W. O’Daniel, I Corps commander, had directed that Kelly be retaken.1 This introductory statement was made to emphasize the level of attention that the loss of Kelly commanded. One of the prime objectives of this battalion conference was to prepare Lieutenant Colonel Roye for participation in the plan to be developed later at regiment. He wanted to be totally versed in what had gone right and what had gone wrong with the aborted assault on Kelly that morning. What had gone wrong was quite obvious. The Chinese wanted Kelly— perhaps for the simple tactical advantage, perhaps to support their position in the ongoing talks at Panmunjom. Whatever their reason, they had executed a well-planned ambush and followed it up with a vigorous 6 The Fight for Outpost Kelly defense of their newly held ground. The determined defense by the Chinese demonstrated a strong intent to hold Kelly; this was supported by the fact that more than one thousand rounds of artillery, mortar, and tank shells had been placed on Kelly during our assault and that our attack force had been repulsed twice. The strength of our attacking forces had been inadequate to overcome the will of the enemy. What had gone right was the aggressive posture and actions of the infantrymen in the assault force. A high quality of leadership had been present. The determination of the enemy, and the weather and the poor footing in particular, had not stopped the friendly forces from trying twice to secure the hill. Two attempts, taking losses both times, showed a high level of leadership and morale. In summary, the combat action over the last day had been a defeat by any standard of measure. There was a general consensus that a new plan must feature a larger assault force and that a better job must be done in suppressing the enemy mortar ¤re. The question period did not last long, and I made no contribution. We were told that we would be advised when the new plan was ready and that we could expect an Operations order to coordinate all elements involved in the plan. The CO thanked everyone for his input, and then we were dismissed. I was glad to leave, to get clear of the bunker and what the meeting had meant—a detailed review of a failure, a failed plan paid for with a lot of casualties. Outside I re®ected on command responsibility and accountability. The meeting had been stressful for me, and I could only imagine how it was for the CO. The ultimate responsibility for whatever went right, or went wrong, rested with the CO. That is what command is all about. In combat, everything else being equal, it is better to be successful. As I made my way to the tank perimeter to brief Holt, my path took me past the battalion medical aid station. It was mid afternoon, and the place was still full. Evacuation of wounded and injured had been going on since morning, but poor road conditions slowed the process. Helicopters were inoperable in this kind of weather. There were many injured men here other than those wounded by enemy action. A lot were here due to occupational hazards: an ankle broken falling down a muddy slope; a badly slashed hand while moving through barbwire; sprains and pulled ligaments incurred scrambling for cover from incoming mortar Fight for Outpost Kelly / 93 ¤re; and chills and fever from living soaking wet during four days of monsoon rains. A high percentage of the men at the station were KSC porters. Our casualty reports listed only the U.S. personnel; we had a tendency to forget about the Koreans, the so-called noncombatants. Sergeant First Class Holt said he thought I looked like I had been run over by a tank. If...