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Chapter 5 DISASTER AT ISANDLWANA An enemy presence near camp At the camp of the No. 3 Column there was nothing to suggest disaster, or even danger, early on Saturday, January 22nd. The Zulu army seemed far away, or, if it was not, then it was remarkably elusive and timid. There were about eighteen hundred men, combatants and noncombatants, at the camp. The six companies of British infantry and four companies of the 3rd Regiment of the Native Contingent, a section of artillery with two guns and a mixed troop of mounted colonials seemed sufficient to look after things there. Anyway, they expected to move soon, as the column continued to make its way slowly into Zululand. The 3rd Regiment was represented in the camp by two companies of each battalion. One company of each supplied pickets outside the camp. The other provided their relief. The camp was protected against surprise by two lines of outposts during the day and by one at night. The daytime lines consisted of men mounted, circling the camp at approximately three miles distance, and on foot, posted as sentries approximately one and a half miles out. At certain vantage points there were outposts, where officers were stationed and on which sentries could fall back in case of trouble. The mounted men were withdrawn to camp at dark, but the men on foot were withdrawn only half the distance towards the camp, where they formed the night line.1 No. 9 Company of the 1st Battalion, men of the isiGqoza, was stationed in front and rear of Isandlwana hill. The preceding day the men in front had occupied a conical hill about a mile and half in front of the camp and about three quarters of a mile north of the track towards the Mangeni. At night they withdrew across a small stream to a hillock about half way back towards the camp.2 It is not clear where the men behind Isandlwana were posted. No. 5 Company of the 2nd Battalion, Phakade’s men, was stationed on some high ground where a spur juts out from the ridge to the north. This position was about 1200 yards from camp. There was a path between the ridge and the camp which an enemy might use for quick descent, and it had to be guarded, even at night. The path allowed quick communication and, if necessary, hasty withdrawal to the camp in case of danger.3 From these two outposts sentries were distributed in a rough arc around the north of the camp. British regulars were similarly posted to the south. In the daytime mounted men took up positions further east along the ridge several miles from camp and beyond it to the north.4 No. 5 Company of the 2nd Battalion had relieved No. 4 Company on picket the night before. Both were amaChunu. The isiGqoza had been on picket thirty-six hours since the column arrived at Isandlwana, and was due to be relieved by No. 6 Company of the 1st Battalion.5 The composition of No. 6 Company is not definitely known. Very likely they were amaBhele.6 They fell in at six to relieve the isiGqoza, but the rapid unfolding of events prevented them from doing so.7 The camp was secure against surprise. It was not secure against attack. It was neither entrenched nor laagered. The fighting men left at camp by the Lieutenant General numbered approximately twelve hundred. The commandant of the camp had been instructed to keep them in a compact force in defence of the camp, but neither he nor the Lieutenant General seriously considered the camp might be attacked. There was no visible evidence that a large Zulu force was in the vicinity. The Zulu army – between fifteen and twenty thousand men – had bivouacked that night ten miles away. It was ready to attack – if not on the 22nd, because of the new moon, then on the 23rd. The Lieutenant General did not know about it. His mounted scouts had not discovered the enemy’s army. The inference which might have been made from verbal information was not made.8 The Lieutenant General apparently expected the enemy to do what he wanted him to do. His attention was focused on the opposition to his reconnaissance in front. He divided his force in the presence of the enemy and both parts were vulnerable to attack. Indeed, the part reinforcing the reconnaissance, strung out as it was, was more...

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