Patton's Pawns: The 94th US Infantry Division at the Siegfried Line

6. The Division Unleashed

The lack of armored support for the 94th Infantry Division’s operations was a problem recognized by Major General Walker at XX Corps. It was clear that the division had little chance of breaching the Orscholz Switch without armor. He appealed to General Patton, noting that the 10th Armored Division was resting and stocking up in his area, but General Eisenhower refused to release this reserve until the 94th Infantry Division had proved itself by breaching the Orscholz Switch. Consequently, Walker met General Malony at the 2nd/302nd’s command post in Borg on February 15 to confer. He stressed the need for an early breakthrough and agreed that the successful execution of Malony’s plan to take the Münzingen Ridge should be enough to convince Eisenhower that a breach had been achieved. However, there was only one tank company available. The remainder of the 778th Tank Battalion, whose B Company was already with the 94th, would not arrive before March 16. Malony asked Walker for permission to use the full weight of his division in the next attack, and Walker replied, “All right, shoot the works!” Meanwhile, Major General Walker at XX Corps had been working on Field Order Number 16, his plan for clearing the Saar-Moselle Triangle. The plan included the use of Major General Morris’s 10th Armored Division , which was now standing by in the Metz area. The division had been fully replenished after its experiences in the Battle of the Bulge and a later attachment to the Seventh Army, in which it had been involved in repelling a German counterattack. It now had two combat commands on call to assist the 94th Infantry Division from February 20.1 6 The Division Unleashed Walker’s unleashing of the 94th Infantry Division resulted in Malony’s Field Order Number 11, calling for a full-scale attack by all three regiments on February 19. Colonel Hagerty’s 301st Infantry was to make the main assault on Münzingen Ridge from Sinz, Butzdorf, and Tettingen with the objectives of Münzingen and Faha. Colonel Johnson’s 302nd Infantry was to attack from Campholz Woods with Orscholz as its main objective. Colonel McClune’s 376th Infantry was to seize Bannholz Woods and then secure the division’s left ®ank by supporting the attack on Münzingen Ridge and occupying Der Langen Woods at the northern end, while retaining one battalion of men on trucks as divisional reserve. The artillery ¤re plan was carefully coordinated by Brigadier General Fortier and Brig. Gen. Julius E. Slack of XX Corps. The corps artillery would engage targets beyond an arbitrary line drawn ¤ve thousand yards from the existing front line. To obtain maximum surprise there would be no¤ring before H-hour. The corps artillery would begin with ¤fteen minutes of ¤re on German command posts so as to disrupt communications and control. The enemy artillery positions would be engaged for the next thirty minutes with a maximum volume of ¤re, after which neutralization of these positions would continue for a further hour. Then all known and suspected enemy lines of communication would be engaged for the next ten hours. In view of the narrowness of the battle¤eld, it was thought that interdiction on all focal points, such as crossroads and townships, might not only prevent any reinforcement, but might also cause abandonment of vehicles and heavy equipment in case of a retreat. The plan also allowed ®exibility for engaging any targets of opportunity that arose. The divisional artillery, including the cannon companies of the 301st and 302nd Infantry, would concentrate on the enemy defenses, command posts, and lines of communication within the ¤ve-thousand-yard belt of operations , ¤ring at the maximum sustained rate for thirty minutes after H-hour, thereafter switching to neutralization and on-call requests. The 774th Tank Destroyer Battalion was also given a role in this ¤re plan. Part of the ¤re plan was a bombing attack by nine squadrons of the U.S. Army Air Force, but because of low, broken clouds on the morning of February 19, their participation in the attack was postponed until the afternoon. All units were urged to carry out detailed reconnaissance. One patrol made it to the crest of Münzingen Ridge and was able to plot the enemy positions there, while another, under Sgt. Frederick J. Ramondini of the 301st’s intel118 / Division Unleashed ligence and...