Sherman's Mississippi Campaign

2. The Plan

After retaking Jackson in the summer of 1863, Sherman had thought about moving down the railroad track toward Meridian, a small town of about four hundred people, located about one hundred miles east of Jackson near the Alabama border. This bustling community contained warehouses, storehouses , depots, an armory, a hospital, and other pertinent military items. It served as a hub for Confederate traf¤c between Mississippi and the rest of the eastern Confederacy. The Confederacy used the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, which intersected at Meridian , to shuttle into the Magnolia State vast amounts of men and supplies. Additionally, these lines worked as an important interior route to transfer Confederate troops from one front to another quickly and ef¤ciently.1 At the time, Sherman decided that because of the hot summer weather and the exhaustion of his men, he should postpone any movement on Meridian . Simultaneously, however, he became determined to rid the state of its guerrilla elements and other Confederate forces who harassed river traf¤c and posed a threat to the Mississippi River itself. Convinced that a strike at Meridian could stymie these Confederate forces, at every opportunity he pressed his request to take the town. His plan suggested the possibility of an amphibious assault near Mobile, a large cavalry raid, numerous feints, or a march of more than twenty thousand infantry straight across 150 miles of enemy territory.2 2 / The Plan Ulysses S. Grant, Sherman’s superior, had bigger plans than Meridian, but an attack on the Mississippi town would ¤t nicely into his larger strategy. Grant sent letters to Henry W. Halleck on several occasions in July and August suggesting an attack on Mobile. Grant believed that the Alabama city could provide an excellent base for his operations into the Confederate states further east, where he could hit some of the South’s manufacturing and supply sectors. Mobile could provide the southernmost anchor for another split of the Confederacy. The important port city had become, with the Union victories at Shiloh and Corinth, the only rail link, besides Meridian, from Mississippi to the eastern Confederacy.3 Halleck thought Texas was a more important target, so he did not provide Grant with the approval he wished, re®ecting President Abraham Lincoln’s belief that Texas was especially important to U.S. interests. The president wrote Grant in August that “an expedition against Mobile . . . would appear tempting, were it not [for the] recent events in Mexico.” Emperor Napoleon of France had made threatening remarks about the possible annexation of Texas into Mexico, a country he had nearly conquered after several years of struggle. Lincoln wanted to show a strong American military presence in the Lone Star State. Neither Halleck nor the president, however, realized that the low river level at that time of year would prevent any serious Union army movement into Texas. Although Grant did not secure permission to attempt a capture of Mobile in the summer of 1863, the importance of the city never left his mind, and he hoped that Sherman would have an opportunity to attack the city later on.4 As early as August 1863, therefore, Sherman had begun to make plans for a move against Meridian. He ordered a map containing his intended route. The map included information on Meridian in Mississippi as well as Demopolis and Mobile in Alabama. He hoped to move across Mississippi as soon as his men were rested and the cool fall weather had arrived.5 When word came in September that Confederate general Braxton Bragg had cornered General William Rosecrans at Chattanooga, Sherman thought that the best way to relieve his colleague was to direct an attack on Mobile through Meridian, making a “powerful diversion.” He argued that, if the Army of the Tennessee moved rapidly across Mississippi and Alabama, Joseph Johnston would have to take large numbers of men from Bragg’s army in order to counter the move in Alabama. Sherman believed that Rosecrans The Plan / 15 could hold the line in Tennessee and “doubt[ed] if our re-enforcements [could] reach him in time to do good.”6 The following month, while at Corinth, Mississippi, Sherman wrote to J. A. Rawlins that if Meridian and Enterprise, Mississippi, were stripped of their garrisons, and Mississippi Confederate general Stephen D. Lee’s cavalry had moved into Tennessee, Federal divisions garrisoning Natchez and the Big Black River...