Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation

Conclusion

115 Conclusion Occasionally฀I฀hear฀talk฀from฀the฀dead of฀the฀Korea฀of฀centuries฀past. They฀usually฀leave฀out฀a฀few฀things,฀I฀think. After฀all,฀how฀could฀they฀say฀everything in฀one฀brief฀resurrection? —ko฀un,฀“discipline฀a nd฀after” Korea is an open book whose story line has yet to be written to the end. Whether peace or conflict will prevail is to a great extent dependent on the mind-sets that will guide not only future decision makers but also the societies at large in both Koreas. I have sought to advance a number of suggestions about how to understand and engage this ongoing political struggle. Two components have been essential in this endeavor. The first task consisted of presenting the conflict on the peninsula not only in conventional ideological and geopolitical terms but also, and primarily, as a confrontation between competing identities . Thus I examined in Part I how antagonistic identity practices have emerged historically and how they continue to shape the current conflict. Of central importance here is understanding how the division of the peninsula and especially the legacy of the Korean War have dominated subsequent political dynamics. An unusually high degree of state control of security policy led to a situation in 116฀ ฀ ·฀ ฀ conclusion which each side sought to legitimize itself by demonizing its archenemy across the dividing line. The result was two sets of diametrically opposed identity patterns—one shaped by Communist and the other by capitalist ideologies—that continuously fuel hatred and fear. A political crisis is thus always already underway on the peninsula . The question is simply when and under what circumstances it reemerges. The latest standoff became apparent in 2002 when U.S. foreign policy suddenly became more aggressive and a controversy erupted in regard to North Korea’s nuclear ambition. An inquiry into the emergence of hostile identity patterns in Korea does more than merely widen our understanding of current security dilemmas, for the key to a more peaceful future lies in recognizing the constructed nature of identities and the conflicts that issue from them. Expressed in other words, difference does not necessarily lead to violence. The source of conflict is located in the political manipulation of the tension between identity and difference, in attempts to isolate a few arbitrarily selected elements of the past in order to construct around them a mythological division between inside and outside. “Politicians,” one commentator points out, “have no hesitation in appealing to the collective memory—in a carefully selective way—in order to justify their present conduct by the past.”1 Once these artificial demarcations of identity have become internalized in language, school curricula, political institutions, moral discourses, and the like, their mythical origin appears more and more real until the ensuing worldview, and the conflicts that they generate, seem inevitable, even natural. This process has been particularly pronounced in Korea, where an unusually hermetic dividing line has provided each state with the opportunity to disseminate its ideological worldview without being challenged by the other side. The second major task, and the content of Part II, consisted of articulating the contours of an alternative and more peaceful security arrangement. I argued that two components are essential for locating a way out of the current culture of insecurity: the promotion of communication and face-to-face contacts among Koreans on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone, and a willingness to accept that after half a century of division, North and South Korean people have developed a different—and perhaps inherently incompatible—sense of identity and politics. Some progress has recently been made in both realms, but much more needs to be done. The state continues to con- conclusion฀ ฀ ·฀ ฀ 117 trol intra-Korean dynamics in both parts of the divided peninsula, and only very few signs indicate that either side might be willing to accept the other on its own terms. The purpose of my concluding remarks is not only to recapitulate the main insights and arguments that I have advanced in the preceding pages but also, and primarily, to outline how processes of globalization will intensify the security challenges ahead—and therefore also the need to search for a path to reconciliation. GLOBALIZATION฀AND฀INFORMATION฀TECHNOLOGY Cultures of insecurity, and the dualistic and antagonistic thinking patterns that sustain them, are, of course, not unique to Korea. They are part of a much more deeply embedded tendency to define security in militaristic...