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205 Notes Introduction 1. As Malcolm MacDougall writes, “Meaning is produced by our whole bodies, not just by conscious thought. We see with our bodies, and any image we make carries the imprint of our bodies; that is to say, of our being as well as the meanings we intend to convey.” MacDougall, The Corporeal Image, 3. 2. Marx and Engels, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto, 109, translation modified. 3. Graham, The Life and Work of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, 188–89. 4. Allygurgh Institute Gazette, December 23, 1869. 5. For a recent and subtle discussion of the colonial archive, see Arondekar, For the Record. 6. Work on colonial discourse analysis is extensive, and some of the most astute examples of this line of thinking include Timothy Mitchell, Gyan Prakash, Anne McClintock, Zeynep Celik, and Paul Greenhalgh. 7. The following works on colonial photography show both the insight and limit of this line of thinking. See Hight and Sampson, Colonialist Photography; Maxwell, Colonial Photography and Exhibitions; and Edwards, Raw Histories. 8. For an alternate critique of this strand of postcolonial thought, see Dutta, The Bureaucracy of Beauty, 9–16. 9. Taylor and Great Britain, India Office, The People of India, i. 10. Pinney discusses at length the Indian-owned photographic studios of the nineteenth century, which sustained their business by making photographic portraits in fairly conventional forms borrowed from the British portraiture tradition. See Pinney, Camera Indica, 72–107. 11. Dobson, quoted ibid., 46. 12. Risley and Crooke, The People of India, Plate XX. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 182–83. 16. Ibid., 184–85. Anderson is concerned with the production of the state-form under colonialism, a form that the postcolonial nation inherits, often without significant change in the geography, forms of local “heritage,” and the systematic quantifications of the racial, ethnic, and religious contours of the population. 206 notes to introduction 17. Benjamin, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, vol. 2: 1927–1934, 328. 18. Barthes refers to the “punctum” as that element of a photograph that pierces the viewer, undoing both the scene of the photograph and the scene of viewing; Kracauer and Benjamin are interested in the spark of contingency in the photograph that is made possible only through a dialectic between the moment frozen in the frame and the moment of viewing. See, respectively, Barthes, Camera Lucida; Kracauer, The Mass Ornament; and Benjamin, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, vol. 2, “A Short History of Photography.” 19. “It is through the camera that we first discover the optical unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual unconscious through psychoanalysis.” Benjamin, Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, vol. 4: 1938–1940, 266. 20. This is as opposed to concepts preceding the object. Benjamin’s approach is properly materialist and phenomenological. 21. Merleau-Ponty and Lefort, The Visible and the Invisible, 254, translation modi- fied. In the original, “L’intouchable, ce n’est pas un touchable en fait inaccessible,— l’inconscient, ce n’est pas une representation en fait inaccessible. Le négatif n’est pas un positif qui est ailleurs (un transcendant)—C’est un vrai négatif.” Merleau-Ponty and Lefort, Le visible et l’invisible, 307–8. 22. In an essay on Cézanne, Merleau-Ponty himself notes that looking through the camera means seeing a world whose subjective determination differs from the world we experience with the naked eye. He provides the example of a train, which, in a film, appears to approach and get bigger more rapidly than it would if seen without the camera’s lens. The camera accentuates objective geometric relations among objects, relations that are not often visible to the naked eye: “To say that a circle seen obliquely is seen as an ellipse is to substitute for our actual perception what we would see if we were cameras: in reality we see a form which oscillates around the ellipse without being an ellipse.” Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-Sense, 14. Also see MerleauPonty , The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, “Eye and Mind.” 23. Husserl, The Essential Husserl, 308. 24. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 167. 25. For the best account of aisthēsis in its Greek usage, see Heller-Roazen, The Inner Touch. Also see Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic. 26. The composite account I give here is based on the following: Trevelyan, Cawnpore; Shepherd, A Personal Narrative of the Outbreak and Massacre at Cawnpore; Thomson, The Story of Cawnpore; and...