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79 Deeper Problems Turning up the contrast in their reception with Freud’s view of delusion formation in psychosis as activity of recovery (or rescue) of the loss of world, Carl Jung and Ludwig Binswanger would diagnose a certain streamlining of Freud’s concept of projection in delusions as illustration of the living end a patient has arrived at when gadget goes to psychosis. The first man’s negative transference onto Freud is the second one’s schooling by Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, psychoanalysis and technologization are in it together. In Being and Time the address to the uncanny is dead giveaway— like the giveaway of the dead—of the philosopher’s intention to drive the stake of his philosophy’s claim through the new start of Freud’s thought, but (re)claimed on his own terms and turf as the end(s) of philosophy. No wonder Heidegger was rubbed the wrong way when Binswanger sought to harness him and Freud together to a new modality of understanding and treatment of philosophy, I mean psychosis. Following Heidegger’s logic of curtailment and emplacement of psychoanalysis, we might argue in turn that philosophy can never be “on” psychosis since already alongside and inside psychosis as yet another projection of ego libido alone. Just as the relocation assignment of psychoanalysis to the wound of technologization, the narcissistic shortfall of its own insight and prosthesis, at the same time justifies immersion in Freud’s science when in contempt or contemplation of mourning, so philosophy forced out on a limb in psychotic limbo—on the edge philosophy and psychosis thus share—can at the same time be viewed as a privileged perspective that the student of psychosis would rather not forego (at least Dick thought so). It is at this point of not letting go that Freud introduced endopsychic perception. In The Interpretation 80 Deeper Problems of Dreams, Freud reserved for future treatment the relationship assumed between the self-observing agency, which, Freud stresses, is particularly prominent in philosophical minds, and both paranoia and endopsychic perception (Standard Edition 5:505–6). In the 1914 edition Freud adds a footnote to “On Narcissism: An Introduction” to indicate a place where his theoretical reservations can be confirmed. Binswanger’s encounters with psychosis between psychoanalysis and the philosophy of Dasein constitute a prominent intertextual trajectory in this study. Of course I had to take Dick’s word on it. But for me, too, there is a connection in disconnection that maintains the new words of “Daseinanalysis ” as transferentially legible. Binswanger spent the early years of his relations with Freud as the good Swiss heir or parent. But he also spent these years in writer’s block over a projected two-volume study that by the end was to have grounded Freud’s science in the corpus of psychiatric knowledge. Freud didn’t recognize his own work in the prepwork of the first volume, which did at last appear. Over many more years Binswanger never made it to the sense of an ending that would have qualified him as Freud’s representative on neutralized turf. In his letter to Freud dated February 15, 1925, Binswanger is still stumbling over Freud’s 1912 telephone analogue for psychoanalytic listening (the tuning of the analyst’s unconscious to the unconscious of the patient). Binswanger thus provides us a cross section of his intellectualizing reception of psychoanalysis, which was then taking the form (for over ten years) of the uncompletable book in two parts, the second of which (never to appear) was set aside for the presentation of psychoanalytic hermeneutics. I have long been impressed by your remark that the analyst’s unconscious must be as passive towards the analysand as the telephone receiver is to the transmitting place, etc. I fully understand this pronouncement as a technical principle, but I have always wondered on what “capacity” or intellectual faculty you think that this type of “understanding” is really based. . . . Far more interesting to me than making a successful interpretation and learning something new about someone else’s unconscious is the problem of what it is that enables me to make the interpretation in the first place. One person will reply: experience; but your technological analogy shows that you do not take so simple a view of the problem. After all, one has to ask how that kind of experience is possible, how it comes about. Freud replies on February 22 that the analog served its descriptive purpose...

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