The Force of the Virtual: Deleuze, Science, and Philosophy

Notes

· 333 · Notes Preface 1. Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,” Critical Inquiry (Winter 2004): 225–48. 2. Ibid., 242–43. 3. “The Metaphysics of Science: An Interview with Manuel DeLanda” (Afterword in the present volume). 4. “Interstitial Life: Some Remarks on Causality and Purpose in Biology” (chapter 4 in the present volume). Introduction 1. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 112. 2. Ibid., 112. 3. Ibid., 118. 4. Deleuze and Guattari use this expression in A Thousand Plateaus to describe the relationship between the human body, tools, and products: “The hand as a general form of content is extended in tools, which are themselves active forms implying substances, or formed matters; finally products are formed matters, or substances, which in turn serve as tools. Whereas manual formal traits constitute the unity of composition of the stratum, the forms and substances of tools and products are organized into parastrata and epistrata that themselves function as veritable strata and mark discontinuities, breakages, communications and diffusions, nomadisms and sedentarities, multiple thresholds and speeds of relative deterritorialization in human populations. For with the hand as a formal trait or general form of content a major threshold of deterritorialization is reached and opens, an accelerator that in itself permits a shifting interplay of comparative deterritorializations and reterritorializations—what makes this acceleration possible is, precisely, phenomena of ‘retarded development’ in the organic strata.” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 61. 334 NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 5. Ibid., 119. 6. See Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 32–34, and Steven Shaviro’s analysis of appetition in the present volume. This term is also used by Leibniz in his Monadology in reference to the “action of the internal principle which brings about the change or the passing from one perception to another.” In Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, Monadology, ed. Paul Janet, trans. George Montgomery (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Company, 1990), 253–54. 7. “L’Intelligence organise le monde en s’organisant elle-même.” Jean Piaget, La Construction du réel chez l’enfant (Paris: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1937), 311. 8. Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (New York: Continuum, 2002), 135. 9. Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 16. 10. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 63. 11. Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 38. 12. Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 114–17. 13. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 369–74. 14. “A distinction must be made between the two types of science, or scientific procedures: one consists in ‘reproducing,’ the other in ‘following.’ The first involves reproduction, iteration and reiteration; the other, involving itineration, is the sum of the itinerant, ambulant sciences. Itineration is too readily reduced to a modality of technology, or of the application and verification of science. But this is not the case: following is not at all the same thing as reproducing, and one never follows in order to reproduce. The ideal of reproduction, deduction, or induction is part of royal science, at all times and in all places, and treats differences of time and place as so many variables, the constant form of which is extracted precisely by the law.” (A Thousand Plateaus, 372). 15. See Jacques Lacan, “Truth and Science,” trans. Bruce Fink, Newsletter of the Freudian Field 3, no. 1 & 2 (Spring/Fall 1989): 4–29. Lacan argues here that modern logic is “the strictly determined consequence of an attempt to suture the subject of science, and Gödel’s last theorem shows that this attempt fails, meaning that the subject in question remains the correlate of science, but an anti-nomial correlate since science turns out to be defined by the deadlock endeavor to suture the subject” (10). 16. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), Kuhn writes that theoretical conflicts arising between existent and emergent scientific paradigms are “terminated by a relatively sudden and unstructured event like the [visual] gestalt switch” (122). It should be noted that Kuhn is NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 335 in some ways critical of...