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53 Memorandum To: President Obama From: Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard C. Bush III Date: January 23, 2014 Subject: Korean Crisis Prompts Confrontation with China Summary and Recommendations The latent possibilities of internal instability in North Korea or of an armed conflict between the two Korea and the attendant risks of a Sino-American confrontation persist. Quite apart from these very worrisome scenarios, the United States and China face the reality of a nuclear-armed North Korea that resists all pressures to denuclearize, is intent on expanding its nuclear arsenal qualitatively and quantitatively, and repeatedly threatens to renew provocations against the ROK. Your administration needs to redouble its efforts to pursue closer policy coordination with China, thereby reducing North Korea’s freedom of action and limiting the possibilities of an acute peninsular crisis. Without shared understandings and parallel policies between the United States and China, the risks to regional peace and security and to the non-proliferation regime will continue to grow. At worse, we could face renewed armed conflict on the peninsula that could lead to a direct confrontation with China that neither country seeks. In the absence of meaningful cooperation with Beijing, the possibilities for a maturing political-military relationship with China could also sharply diminish. We recommend that you personally convey to President Xi Jinping that the risks in Korea are shared risks, and represent a defining test case of building “a new model of major power relations” between our two countries. We need to emphasize to Beijing that the United States will take all necessary measures to protect its interests and those of its regional allies while also imparting that these steps are not designed to destabilize North Korea and are not directed against China. Enhanced information sharing between the United States and China offers one means by which Washington and Beijing can begin to increase cooperation and assure each other about our respective intentions. BLACK SWANS NIGHTMARES 54 jonathan d. pollack and richard c. bush iii The United States should reaffirm its readiness to share intelligence about known or suspected locations of the North’s nuclear assets, fissile material holdings and the status of its missile development programs. China for its part has an understanding of internal conditions in the North that far surpasses that of any other state. We should seek China’s views of economic and social conditions in North Korea, including Beijing’s assessment of the possibilities of internal change. At the same time, we need to actively discourage Beijing from undertaking measures that could “lock in” Pyongyang’s claims to standing as a nuclear weapons state (e.g., large-scale economic assistance that insulates North Korea from external pressure). Background North Korea remains East Asia’s conspicuous “strategic outlier.” Its provocative behavior and adversarial policies (first and foremost directed against South Korea and Japan) have long stymied the building of a post-Cold War order in the region. These issues have been made far more worrisome by the “dual crises” involving North Korea: the continued advancement of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapon and missile capabilities; and the latent risks of internal instability in the North, including the risks of a major regional crisis if peninsular instability cannot be effectively managed. North Korea is thus both dangerous and endangered, and it represents a serious threat to the interests of both the United States and China. From your very first weeks as president, you have consistently emphasized that North Korea must make a choice between its nuclear ambitions and its interest in reversing its long economic decline. Pyongyang has repeatedly rejected this choice, insisting that it can pursue both courses of action. Twice during your time as president (in 2009 and again in 2013), North Korea undertook nuclear tests. It has steadily enhanced its capacities for uranium enrichment, has restarted its plutonium production reactor, and has asserted a sovereign right to develop nuclear weapons. Its bellicose rhetoric in early 2013 triggered our decision for B-52 and B-2 overflights of South Korea and the deployment of a carrier battle group to the region. China was very troubled by North Korea’s actions. The North’s third nuclear test triggered especially sharp Chinese criticisms, some of them voiced by Xi in your discussions with him at the Sunnylands meeting. For the first time, China at the highest leadership levels openly acknowledged that North Korean actions posed a direct risk to Chinese interests. Xi also signaled his willingness to cooperate more actively with the United...

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