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Index 215 Abraham, Spencer, 32 Accountability, 4, 164, 196 Across-group sample diversification, 155 Agency-level allocations, 9, 68–107; agency characteristics as variables, 78–80, 100; annual fund allocations as unit of analysis, 70, 76–77; and burrowing of staff, 75; cabinet institutions , extent of presidential power in, 85–89, 97, 98, 104–05; cabinet institutions vs. independent commissions in allocations to swing states, 81–85; and cabinet stability under Obama, 130; congressional influence on, 80, 93–96, 97–98, 101, 174–78; data analysis to test hypotheses, 76–80; external vs. internal policy traits, 70; full use of allocation, 15; future research needs on, 99; and ideology, 75–76, 79–80, 104–05; independent commissions as resistant to influence, 81–85, 93; independent institutions, extent of presidential power in, 89–93, 97, 106– 07; independent variables of interest, 78, 100–01; innovation in, 179–80; insulated independence, 72–73, 78–79, 81–85, 91, 93, 97, 102–03; and mission of agency, 75; myth of agency homogeneity, 69–71; OMB role in, 18, 83, 159, 173–74; and politicization, 73–75, 79, 97, 104–05, 130–31; and presidential discretion, 71–72; reorganization of agencies, 135; responsiveness to presidential electoral interests, 80–96; responsiveness to presidential preferences, 31, 71–76, 161, 170–71; and staff-level homogeneity within an agency, 75. See also Appointees; Bureaucracy; Career civil servants Agriculture Department, 151 Alesina, Alberto, 35 Alternative energy grants, 32 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), 9, 108–32; analysis of stimulus spending (2009–11), 118–23, 131–32; congressional influence on, 114–15; and economic need, 115–17, 120–22, 124–26; enactment and purpose, 1–2, 108–11, 131; how it works, 2, 110–18; and non-stimulus spending, 117–18, 123–31, 132; and presidential power, 111–14 Appointees: authority in federal grants process, 7, 18, 159–67; contact between central agency appointees and subnational appointees, 160–61, 165–66, 168, 170; contact with political institutions, 148–49; and design of grant programs, 14, 167; direct impact of, 164–67; and evaluation 10-2520-6 index.indd 215 1/8/14 3:58 PM 216 index of grant proposals, 16; ideology of president reflected by, 140; increase in number within an agency as method to politicize spending, 140–41, 152; in independent institutions, 89–93, 97; indirect impact of, 159–64; and presidential preferences, 30–31, 74, 161, 189; presidential reliance on, 147–48, 182; prior political experience of, 140; ratio to career-level SES managers, 79; relationship with career civil servants, 160, 165; selection of, 135, 139; vacancies under Obama, 130 Appropriations committees: and ARRA, 120–21; influence on federal funding through oversight of executive branch, 94–96; and non-stimulus spending (2009–11), 124; relationship to independent institutions, 95; state representation on, 48, 54–55, 94–95, 101 ARRA. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 Balance in sources of influence, 8. See also Interconnectedness of forces in driving funding distribution Berry, Christopher, 20 Bertelli, Anthony, 20 Biden, Joe, 2, 119 Big Waiver, 113 Block grant funding, 6, 34, 37, 38, 146, 156, 177, 199 Blumenthal, Sidney, 22, 191 Boehner, John, 115 “Bridge to nowhere,” 21 Brownfields law, 162 Budgetary oversight. See Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bureaucracy, 9, 133–52; administrative control of, 24, 134–36; centralization of power in, 135–36; communication environment and political pressure within, 146–49, 152, 189; congressional delegation to, 11–12, 30, 36, 68, 72, 191, 199; decisionmakers in, 139–42; electoral benefits extracted through political control, 138–51; and incentives for political control, 136–38; innovation by, 179–80; size of federal bureaucracy, 133; state bureaucracy, 156–57, 161, 173, 174–75. See also Agency-level allocations ; Appointees; Career civil servants; Federal grants process Burrowing of agency staff, 75 Bush, George H. W., 29 Bush, George W.: and allocations of FEMA disaster grants, 20; and allocations to swing states, 45, 46–48; and alternative energy programs, 32; and Brownfields law, 162; and economic stimulus programs, 1; and faith-based organizations, 14; and Homeland Security Department, 200; strategic use of appointees by, 60, 140 Byrd, Robert, 48 Cabinet institutions. See Agency-level allocations California: National Park Service’s allocation of grants to, 98; as outlier state for grant allocations to, 45–46 Canes-Wrone, Brandice, 36 Career civil servants: contact with political institutions, 146–47, 152, 172–73; decision to stay or leave jobs based on political environment, 150–51; empowerment of, 134; under...