Understanding Tahrir Square: What Transitions Elsewhere Can Teach Us about the Prospects for Arab Democracy

8. The Strategic Challenges of the Arab Spring

 CHAPTER EIGHT 4HE 3TRATEGIC #HALLENGES OF THE !RAB 3PRING The experiences of Third Wave democratizers hold further lessons, at the strategic level, for Arab democracy activists. As noted earlier, these activists have been a key driver of the events of the Arab Spring. They have sought to leverage the power of crowds, modern technology, and the support of the international community to create a better future for their countries. Having felled dictators, they now face a number of equally daunting challenges as they seek to move toward democracy, including how to structure a transition process that all will regard as legitimate; how to overcome the deep-seated polarization within many Arab societies; whether to include nondemocratic actors in the democratization process; what role the military should play in politics; and how to make the shift from protest to politics. This chapter offers Arab democracy activists some lessons learned from countries elsewhere in the world that have grappled with those challenges. iÛiœ«ˆ˜}Ê>Ê/À>˜ÃˆÌˆœ˜>Ê,œ>`“>« After the collapse of an authoritarian regime, there inevitably follows the question of what comes next: What kind of transitional authority should be established in its place? Who should be responsible for writing (or rewriting) a constitution? Who should organize founding elections? Of course, countries do not always have the luxury of choosing the ideal transition process. What comes after the dictator departs is often the result of intense negotiation among contending political forces, constraining what is and is not possible. This chapter discusses only the ideal.  THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGES OF THE ARAB SPRING The Arab Spring countries have much to learn from transition experiences elsewhere in the world. To date, their own transitions have often been riddled with strategic errors. Egypt, in particular, has foundered repeatedly in its efforts to create a broad-based and inclusive transition process to launch the country on a path toward democracy. It was a mistake following Mubarak’s resignation to entrust the military to lead a caretaker government because it was neither up to the task nor devoid of interests of its own. Rather than serving as the desired honest broker, it only added to the uncertainty and instability surrounding the country’s transition. It was also a mistake to expect an elected constituent assembly to take on the task of constitution writing in addition to its ordinary legislative functions. Furthermore, it was a mistake to turn to the military again for help in ousting Mohamed Morsi’s government. The challenge in any transition is to create a new national decisionmaking process that enjoys broad legitimacy. An equitable, transparent , and inclusive process can enable a country to overcome deep-seated mistrust within society and decisively break with its authoritarian past. Democratic transitions generally begin with a political breakthrough that includes an agreement to hold multiparty elections and write a new constitution , but who oversees the process and how events are sequenced matters greatly. Several lessons are worth sharing. First, a caretaker government that is broadly representative, in that it includes all major political forces within society, should be established to manage the transition. Because such a government has the virtue not only of inclusivity but also of impartiality , it is likely to be viewed as fair by all and therefore to enjoy the trust of the citizenry. In an ideal world, it should supervise the writing of a new constitution and the convening of the first multiparty elections. One successful example of such a caretaker government is the Czechoslovak national unity government that followed the Velvet Revolution, which included representatives of the former communist regime, Civic Forum, and other political forces within society. Because of its representativeness , inclusivity, and limited mandate, it enjoyed broad popular trust and its actions were deemed to be legitimate. In far more cases, the former regime ends up retaining responsibility for managing the transition to democracy, as is now the case in Myanmar . On occasion, that approach has worked. In Indonesia, for example , Suharto’s successor, B. J. Habibie, knew that his legitimacy hinged on establishing a credible election process; because of that, he ended up THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGES OF THE ARAB SPRING  playing an effective caretaker role. Generally, though, such an approach— the political equivalent of putting the foxes in charge of the hen house—is fraught with problems. In many Third Wave transitions, an autocratic regime agreed to elections merely as a tactical ploy—a way of defusing public discontent and legitimizing...