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2. The Hatching of an American "Commitment"
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27 chapter two “Unavoidably, the U.S. is, together with France, committed in Indochina.” —Department of State, 1950 “We are lost if we lose Southeast Asia without a fight. We must do what we can to save Southeast Asia.” —Dean Acheson, 1952 THE HATCHING OF AN AMERICAN “COMMITMENT” When Franklin D. Roosevelt died in April 1945 and Harry Truman became president, Vietnam was a problem on the periphery of America’s concerns . In time, it was to become the central problem, leading to the only war America ever lost. How It All Got Started Through most of World War II, Roosevelt had supported the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination, even though he suspected that a number of his close European allies intended to retain their colonies after the war—the British in the Middle East and South Asia, the French and Dutch in Southeast Asia, and several of the European allies in Africa. As a bridge between his policy of self-determination and the colonial intent of his allies, Roosevelt proposed an interim system of trusteeship, under which colonies such as Indochina , Indonesia, and India would be guaranteed their postwar independence but only after their leaders would first be tutored in responsible governance by their colonial masters—a concept so haughty that it was almost certain to be rejected by the leaders. Roosevelt himself was appalled by colonial rule; in private conversation, he made no secret of his opposition. He was especially upset by French rule in Indochina. “Indochina should not go back to France,” he told Cordell Hull, his secretary of state. “It should be administered by an international trusteeship.” His sympathies were obvious. “France,” he said, “has had the country—thirty 28 The Hatching of an American “Commitment” million inhabitants—for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning.”1 But in the waning months of the war, and of his life, Roosevelt changed his policy. He dropped his trusteeship proposal. He assured his European allies that if they did in fact decide to reimpose their colonial rule after the war, the United States would not raise any public objections. Why did Roosevelt change his mind? The first reason was national interest. His senior military advisers persuaded him that the United States had to control the sea lanes of the Pacific, from Japan south to Australia, once Japanese militarism was defeated. If unstable regimes, possibly run by communist upstarts loyal to Moscow, were set up in Indochina and Indonesia, they believed, U.S. control would be jeopardized and international trade disrupted. The second reason related to the central importance of Europe in his strategic calculations. Roosevelt worried about a weakening of the wartime alliance over an issue, such as European colonialism, that at the moment he thought was not central to the big prize, which was the “unconditional surrender” of the Nazis. Moreover, as Roosevelt scanned the postwar European horizon, it was clear that he would need the cooperation of the English, French, and Dutch if the Soviet Union were to move aggressively into eastern and central Europe, which was exactly what happened. Truman, as president, quickly embraced the main outlines of Roosevelt’s policy. He himself had no fixed agenda except for the obvious tasks: end the war in Europe; finish it finally in Asia, even if he had to use atomic bombs; create the United Nations; and give the world a chance to take a deep breath after the prolonged horrors of World War II. And, in the meantime, if his European allies wanted to restore their colonial rule in such faraway places as Indochina, then let it happen. The United States would not object, at least publicly—though, in private talks with the French, British, and Dutch, Truman stressed that Washington would prefer a policy of gradual selfdetermination for their colonies. At the close of the war, a problem arose in Southeast Asia that was not on Truman’s calendar but should have been. On September 2, 1945, Ho Chi-minh proclaimed Vietnam’s independence, and he did so with nationalist pride and diplomatic cunning. “All men are created equal,” he began, “. . . . endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights: among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Familiar? He stole liberally from the 1776 American Declaration of Independence and from the 1791 French Declaration on the Rights of Man, as he opened a shrewd play for American (and French) [174.129.140.206...