Afghan Lessons: Culture, Diplomacy, and Counterinsurgency

Winning

33 eight Winning I was having trouble forming an objective opinion on how the military campaign was proceeding generally, and not just because any military command in the world tends to issue the most reassuring reading possible of how things are on the ground. In this case, military operations also were taking place hundreds of kilometers from Kabul, in the south and east of the country. The news or reports coming from American, British, and Canadian outposts didn’t always lend themselves to unequivocal readings. For instance, if no international forces were in a remote district, no clashes or incidents would be reported, but did that mean things had calmed down or that it was under Taliban control? Or if the insurgents had chosen the path of suicide bombings and explosive devices planted almost everywhere rather than head-on confrontation with international forces, was this a sign of strength or weakness? Was the fact that the Taliban withdrew quickly after village raids, even at night, a tactical choice or did it mean that they weren’t able to hold the position? The ISAF commander sounded like a stuck record as he continued to repeat at the end of each press briefing, “We don’t doubt the final victory will be ours for the simple fact that the enemy can’t compete with our forces.” Less optimistic statements occasionally came in from commands in the area of operations, which spoke of “stalemate” or “initiative driven by insurgents,” but these were found to be irritating and tended to be ignored. On the one hand, this was understandable, because asserting confidence in victory can be one of the rules of strategic communication. The main thing, however, was not to confuse the messages intended for public communication with the internal analyses and assessments on which decisions were based. 08-2423-0 ch8.indd 33 6/3/13 1:51 PM 34 Afghan Lessons An example of what I mean might be the winter of 2005–06, when a correct diagnosis of how dangerous insurgents were might have prevented the withdrawal of several thousand U.S. soldiers just before a Taliban offensive was launched in spring 2006. Afterward, there was no lack of literature on how much the threat of a Taliban resurgence in recent years had been underestimated. Equally, a number of statements issued by various commanders, from 2006 onward, admitted to having taken certain signals too lightly. There was nothing new in the cautious attitude shown by ISAF leadership or in its intolerance toward anyone who tried to insinuate doubt, especially if that anyone wasn’t wearing a uniform. at morning briefings the military insisted that 90 percent of incidents occurred in a limited area in the south and east of the country along the border with Pakistan, the equivalent of roughly 10 percent of national districts . General David McKiernan, ISAF commander, was also persuaded that the fact that the insurgents were using suicide attacks and bombings proved they were weak, and, indeed, in the medium term this strategy would turn increasingly large segments of the population against them. It was probably true that the insurgents sought to avoid head-on conflict, given the superiority of international forces; however, this new strategy of theirs was drastically reducing the population’s freedom of movement and was creating the view that everything was falling apart. As I’ve already mentioned, it simply wasn’t true that in August 2008 Kabul was surrounded or ready to fall. Indeed, nothing could have been further from the truth. Nonetheless, attacks and sabotage actions along the ring road, the country’s main highway, linking the capital with the south (Kandahar) and west (Herat), had increased considerably in recent months, and before setting off people thought twice about the risk of routes being mined, bridges being blown up, and checkpoints where bribes were demanded. I asked around, trying to get some idea on whether ordinary people felt secure or not, because another characteristic of the vast majority of military staff was that they just didn’t talk to people. The most illuminating answer I got came from an Afghan doctor working for an NGO: “It’s easy to tell people not to worry, that security hasn’t deteriorated . . . because reality is one thing and perceptions are another. . . . When I wake up in the morning, I have to decide whether to go out to buy something to eat, go to the mosque or to my village to visit 08-2423-0...