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Staying within the paradigm of mutual persuasion is certainly good for Taiwan, because it means that whatever choices it makes about the medium- and long-term future will be voluntary. It is also good for the United States, because it will avoid having to decide what to do in complex circumstances in which Taipei faces Chinese pressure, a scenario that is technically peaceful because there is no violence but in which coercion is still present. I would also argue that it is also in China’s interest to continue mutual persuasion and its effort to convince Taiwan’s leaders and its public that an increasingly close relationship with the Mainland—even a resolution of the fundamental dispute—is good for the island. The main reason for doing so is quite practical: the dynamics of Taiwan politics. Although a majority of the public appears to favor the Ma administration’s policy approach, it is not a large majority, and what that majority has endorsed so far are steps where the benefits to Taiwan outweigh the costs. The public is more cautious on political and security issues, because it fears that on those issues the cost-benefit ratio will be reversed. Skepticism turns to outright opposition when it comes to China’s proposal for unification. That is perfectly understandable, because most Taiwan people are more comfortable with the status quo than with an alternative that is vague at best and perhaps unknowable. Not only would they be unable to judge fully the implications of a unification agreement; at least some Taiwan people would view unification through the lens of history and memories of KMT authoritarianism and see a dark future. Their fears of yet another round of constraints imposed by a new group of Chinese outsiders may be unfounded, but the reality of their fears is what counts. Some PRC analysts interpreted Ma’s 2012 victory—erroneously—to mean that he 9 What China Might Do 196 was actually lagging behind Taiwan public opinion and that he had no reason not to catch up.1 For Chinese officials to think that they understand Taiwan politics better than Ma does would be a mistake. The depth of this certainty-uncertainty dilemma will depend on the terms of any agreement that the two sides reach to resolve the fundamental cross-Strait dispute. Specifically, how the sovereignty issue is addressed in such a deal will dictate the mechanism by which it is approved in Taiwan. A solution that requires legislative approval will be hard enough to achieve, because members of the Legislative Yuan (LY) do not wish to open themselves to the charge that they are “selling out Taiwan.” As discussed in chapter 8, amending the ROC constitution requires supermajorities both in the legislature and in a public referendum . So without a broad consensus of the major parties and of the public at large,it would be difficult to ensure that an agreement would endure and not provoke chronic partisan bickering, instability, and polarization. Beijing should therefore work under the assumption that any effort to coerce unification—even a nonviolent effort—would be blocked,if not in the LY then through a referendum. It should also assume that any offers that it made in a persuasion mode would have to be immensely attractive to secure approval. And, of course, the implications of unification for Taiwan’s sense of security— will the PLA be on Taiwan?—would also affect support for any accord. Also, China should continue persuasion, with the attendant willingness to accommodate somewhat the views of the other party, for the sake of its international image. Other countries, particularly nations in East Asia, will be watching how Beijing pursues its Taiwan objectives for clues about how it will behave toward them. A willingness to resort to pressure and leverage and the exploitation of power asymmetries will only increase anxieties that the same tactics will be used against them and so shape perceptions about the trajectory of China’s revival as a great power. Such an inference on the part of China’s neighbors may not be valid, but it is their views that count. Finally, Beijing might modulate its use of tactics that Taiwan might perceive as indicators of preparations to shift from mutual persuasion to a campaign of political pressure (chapter 7 identifies some of them). To continue these tactics only makes persuasion more difficult because of the mistrust that they engender. Instead, China should —permit Taipei to negotiate economic liberalization accords with...

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