Managing India's Nuclear Forces

Development of Nuclear Forces

Abbreviations M 211 10 Development of Nuclear Forces The conditions enveloping India’s nuclear force development changed radically during 1988–90 when India and Pakistan acquired the operational capability to deliver nuclear weapons in each other’s territory using aircraft. They changed substantially again during 1998–2000 when the world accepted the two countries as de facto NWS and both acquired ballistic missiles capable of reaching deep inside the other’s territory. The third major change took place in 2008 when the barriers that had been erected beginning 1970 to prevent the transfer of nuclear and dual use technologies to India began to be lifted. Availability of fissile material for nuclear weapons ceased to be a major inhibitor. This, together with increasing access to dual use technologies, has made it possible for India to move up the nuclear hardware ladder more easily . At the same time the fact that Pakistan now has the operational capability to strike a large number of targets deep inside India, using fairly survivable ballistic missiles, has placed unprecedented premium on India’s ability to deter such strikes. This altered situation, where India’s need for deterrence as well as its ability to provide for such deterrence have both gone up significantly, has made India’s long entrenched, prestige-centred approach to nuclear weapons (which later got extended to nuclear forces) strategically untenable. The country can no longer afford a path that is determined primarily by political and technological possibilities. It needs a path that is based on deterrence needs and illuminated by a thought-through nuclear strategy. India’s current nuclear force management system has been examined in Chapter 8, and the considerations that need to be factored into developing nuclear strategy in Chapter 9. This chapter looks at the constraints that inhibit clear sighted nuclear force development in India, and what could be done to set matters right. 212  Managing India’s Nuclear Forces Normal Constraints Financial costs, technological limitations, and the danger of following a competitive path that does not improve one’s security environment and may worsen it are matters that concern nearly all nuclear powers. In India’s case financial costs have not been an issue so far. Capital costs have not been significant for two reasons: one, the bomb and missile development programmes have benefited greatly from the country’s civil nuclear and space programmes; and two, India’s nuclear competition till now has only been with Pakistan, and not China. Nuclear reactors and plutonium separation facilities, set up as an integral part of the civil programme have provided almost free fissile material for the weapons programme. Similarly, the solid propellant launch vehicles developed for India’s satellites have substantially reduced the costs of India’s ballistic missile programme. India’s satellite manufacturing capabilities developed for civilian use have reduced the costs of space-based communications and surveillance needed for C&C. India’s ability to take advantage of a common civil– military technology base to pursue its strategic weapons programme will, however, gradually reduce in the future, especially if the country tries to develop a substantial strike capability against China. A modestly conceived minimum deterrence capability against China will not cost much, but a competitive one certainly will. During 1940–96, the US spent $5,821 billion in 1996 dollars on its nuclear arsenal. Of this only seven per cent was spent on building the bomb, while 10 times as much (70 per cent) was spent on deploying, targeting, controlling, and defending against the bomb (Schwartz 1998). Expenditures associated with deployment capability under alert conditions, covering the issues of safety security, and C&C are considerable for a large arsenal. These have not been significant so far because India has adopted two approaches to save on operating costs. One is to maintain a passive arsenal which makes exercising negative control as well as ensuring safety, security and C&C easy during peacetime. This approach will, however, pose exacerbated challenges when both negative and positive controls need to be exercised simultaneously . The other cost saving approach adopted is to go for limited mobility for survival — an approach that is logical and workable against Pakistan. But China, which already has counterforce capability against static garrisons, is a different proposition. Against China, missiles will need to get out fast from their congregated sites, spread Development of Nuclear Forces  213 out rapidly, and stay out operationally ready for adequate periods. It is neither easy nor cheap to achieve...