Managing India's Nuclear Forces

India's Nuclear Force Management System

Abbreviations M 175 8 India’s Nuclear Force Management System The system used to exercise C & C over nuclear forces and the one used to manage them are different in every NWS. While the reins of the C&C system are held tightly by the NCA in every country, the system that manages nuclear forces everywhere, except in India, is largely a sub system of the country’s defence management system. In the US the Department of Energy (DOE) produces warheads and bombs in its laboratories on the basis of specifications jointly prepared by the departments of defence and energy. Beyond that the DOE plays no role in the management of nuclear forces. In the UK even warhead production is carried out within the Ministry of Defence (MOD). In all democratic countries, other than India, the nuclear force management system, unlike the C&C system, is under the Minister of Defence, with the Prime Minister (or the President) playing a policy directing and overseeing role. The very different position prevailing in India stems primarily from the power and influence of the aptly called ‘strategic enclave’ within the government, comprising the DAE, Department of Space (DOS) and DRDO.1 The DAE and DOS have always been directly 1 Itty Abraham coined the term ‘strategic enclave’ to describe these institutions because of the very different manner in which they function compared to the other institutions of government (Abraham 1992). They ‘have acquired interests distinct and apart from other critical institutions of the state, including the armed forces — which, at least historically, have been cast in the role of hapless consumers unable to control in any significant way the development of those systems that they will be ultimately responsible for using’ (Tellis 2001: 90–91). 176  Managing India’s Nuclear Forces responsible to the Prime Minister. The DRDO, although under the Defence Minister, gradually became an autonomous power centre beginning 1972 when it started collaborating with the DAE in the development of nuclear bombs. The DRDO got a big bureaucratic boost in 1983 when not only serious work on miniaturising (and more broadly weaponising) the nuclear device, but also the development of strategic missiles began. In the making of policy with regard to nuclear forces, not just nuclear weapons, the power wielded by the DRDO–DAE axis is enormous. Within this axis the DAE has a higher public profile because of the iconic status it has enjoyed from the 1950s, but the DRDO, which handles missile and C&C hardware development and also plays a part role in developing bombs and warheads, is also very powerful.2 Because of the autonomous way the strategic enclave operates, India’s Defence Minister plays a feeble role in the nuclear field with regard to both policy making and management. One reason for this is the belief of the country’s leadership, even today, that the prime purpose of nuclear forces is prestige and not deterrence. This has made the pattern of the DRDO functioning more closely with the DAE and DOS than with the armed forces acceptable. The expectation that the 1998 nuclear tests will mark an inflection point which will see deterrence becoming the dominant objective has been belied. The other big reason for the Defence Minister’s subdued role in the nuclear field is the dystopian way the country’s defence management system has evolved over the decades. A nuclear force management system must logically function within the concentric management circles of defence , headed by the Defence Minister, and of national security headed by the Prime Minister. If either of these enveloping systems, particularly the former, does not function well it is not possible for the country to have a good nuclear force management system. National Security Management The apex of the country’s national security system is the CCS, made up of the Prime Minister and the ministers for Home Affairs, Defence, External Affairs, and Finance. There are several security organisations 2 During the significant 1985–98 decade-and-a-half it was two DRDO heads — V. S. Arunachalam and Abdul Kalam—who wielded the most influence , under the Prime Minister, in nuclear policy-making. India’s Nuclear Force Management System  177 which report to different members of the CCS. These include the three defence services, the major intelligence organisations of RAW and IB, and the ‘strategic enclave’ of DAE, DOS and DRDO. The two principal concerns of the CCS — internal security and external security — have roughly equal...