Managing India's Nuclear Forces

The Triad

106 M Managing India’s Nuclear Forces 4 The Triad India’s 1999 DND states that the country shall create ‘a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets (National Security Advisory Board 1999).’ The basic logic behind triad is to expand counterforce problems for the enemy and improve the penetrativity and reliability of one’s delivery vehicles. There are three countries which currently have triads for strategic nuclear weapons delivery — the US, Russia, and Israel. (Israel’s sea-based leg uses cruise missiles launched from conventional submarines.) France had a triad but now uses only SSBNs. Britain had never acquired landbased missiles and uses only SSBNs now. China effectively gave up its aircraft leg when its aging Soviet-derived H-6 bombers lost their operational utility. It has SSBNs, but they have yet to make an operational patrol. India and Pakistan do not have sea-based legs. Every NWS first acquired aircraft-based means of delivery, then (except for Britain) acquired land-based missiles, and finally those that were able to acquired sea-based missiles. Air Delivery Using aircraft for nuclear delivery was easy for the US, the USSR and the UK because they already had bombers suitable to carry nuclear weapons, and long range bombing operations was a well established capability, especially in the case of the US and the UK. The arrival of jet propulsion and aerial tankers added to the potency of nuclear bombers, but at the same time air defence capabilities, using interceptor aircraft, anti-aircraft missiles and quick firing guns, and supported by radar surveillance and radar fire control were also improving — at a broadly faster rate. Electronic warfare capabilities helped both sides — those seeking to penetrate and those trying to intercept. The overall balance tilted steadily against large, high flying bombers. The Triad  107 This, and the considerable reduction in the size and weight of nuclear bombs, made the use of smaller, faster strike aircraft capable of flying low attractive. The NWS that came up outside the NPT — Israel, India, and Pakistan — all went for such aircraft, aided by the fact that their strike targets lay not too far away. There were several advantages that fighter-attack aircraft offered India as means of nuclear weapons delivery against Pakistan. Bombing operations against Pakistan, including integral support operations, has been a long established capability within the IAF. India has several dozen airbases and forward airfields from which these and other aircraft can conveniently operate against Pakistan. Most counter value targets in Pakistan lie close to the border and within comfortable low flying range. Moreover, the air power balance has been steadily tilting in India’s favour during the last two decades. Today India has about 50 Mirage 2000 and 140 Su-30 aircraft that can strike deep inside Pakistan, while Pakistan has only about 45 F-16 A/B and 18 F-16 C/D aircraft that have a reasonable chance to intercept them. Pakistan’s radar coverage and ground-based low altitude interception capabilities have also gone downhill in relation to the threat they need to counter. The AWACS capability India has recently acquired through Israeli Phalcon radar gives it an added penetrativity advantage. The four Saab AEW&C aircraft Pakistan has got from Sweden and the four ZDK-03 systems on Y-8F-600 it is getting from China are not in the same class. The technical and operational capabilities of Indian aircraft in important fields like night operations, nap-of-the-earth flying , and electronic warfare have vastly improved. The next generation fighter-strike aircraft India is shortly to order will further widen the country’s advantage, since Pakistan does not have the resources or technology access to counter this except on the margins. India is also (like Pakistan) developing standoff delivery capability. If India can miniaturise warheads to 200 kg or less they can be mounted on supersonic Brahmos missiles of 300 km range, which can be carried by Mirage 2000 and S-30 aircraft. India’s large numbers of sophisticated strike aircraft, and their increasing penetrativity through many different means, will make successful strikes against enough Pakistani counter value targets assured. Using aircraft for nuclear delivery will, however, remove a large number of combat aircraft from India’s conventional air warfare battle order. To ensure guaranteed nuclear weapons delivery, in the face of 108  Managing India’s Nuclear Forces enemy interceptor aircraft and ground-based air defences...