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141 6 Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle lawrence scheinman and govinda avasarala States may seek independence in fuel cycle development for many reasons, including national prestige, regional political prominence, technological independence, assurance of nuclear fuel supply, or even a determination to acquire nuclear weapons or to be in a position to do so.1 Whatever the motivation , the link between national enrichment and reprocessing programs and nuclear proliferation suggests that the forthcoming expansion of the civil nuclear industry could bring a commensurate increase in the risk of proliferation if each state develops indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. However, while the nonproliferation case for limiting facilities capable of producing weapons-usable material is clear, the means by which to do so in a system of sovereign states is not. For over fifty years attempts have been made to organize the nuclear fuel cycle on the basis of global or regionalized multilateral fuel cycle centers. Most of these have come to naught. Article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) asserts an “inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Article I and II of this Treaty,” which most NPT signatories regard as including all fuel cycle activities carried out for peaceful purposes under international safeguards. Any attempt to infringe on the Article IV rights of states is seen as discriminatory and as an attempt to create a divide between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” 06-2147-5 ch6.indd 141 9/7/11 3:33 PM 142 lawrence scheinman and govinda avasarala While the disputes over nuclear sovereignty rumble on, the threats to the nuclear nonproliferation regime are increasing. Even without the projected increase in the number of states in the global nuclear sector, the regime is burdened by long-running weaknesses, not to mention new challenges arising from a changing commercial and geopolitical landscape (see chapter 1). If the global nuclear sector is indeed on the verge of a nuclear renaissance, the need for a secure, controlled approach to the fuel cycle is greater than ever before. In the past such approaches have faltered on the inability of states to reach agreements . The commercial nuclear industry had been by and large absent from the discussion. However, in the globalized, nuclear sector of the twenty-first century, commercial industry has an increasingly important role. With this consideration in mind, the Brookings study sought to elicit the views of both the public and private sectors on a range of multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs) to the fuel cycle.2 After tracing the history of MNAs, this chapter outlines the responses of industry and nonindustry participants when asked to rank the effectiveness and feasibility of a series of MNA proposals. The conclusions drawn from their responses point to a prospective MNA mechanism for addressing the needs of states and companies while simultaneously strengthening the nonproliferation regime. Historical Context of MNAs When the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission held its first meeting in 1946, it was presented with a U.S.-backed proposal, known as the Baruch Plan, for the international control of atomic energy.3 Based on the findings of the State Department’s Acheson-Lilienthal report of the same year, the Baruch Plan proposed the creation of an international agency that would manage, oversee, and have the authority to control, inspect, and license all atomic energy activities. Though the proposal was ambitious at the time—and quixotic by today’s standards —it represents the first effort to multilateralize nuclear energy. However, whatever chance there might have been for acceptance was foreclosed by the cold war tensions that dominated post–World War II relations. Well before the Baruch Plan was finally abandoned, the United States, in its Atomic Energy Act of 1946, established a policy of secrecy and denial, prohibiting any peaceful nuclear cooperation until Congress was satisfied that effective international safeguards were in place. The limitations of this approach—demonstrated by the entry of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom into the “nuclear club,” concern about security implications of a nuclear arms race, and the emergence of unrestricted national nuclear programs in an increasing number of countries—led to a shift in policy to nuclear cooperation and assistance, spelled out in President Dwight Eisenhower’s December 1953 “Atoms for Peace” speech at the United Nations. 06-2147-5 ch6.indd 142 9/7/11 3:33 PM [3.144.172.115] Project...

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