Business and Nonproliferation: Industry's Role in Safeguarding a Nuclear Renaissance

5. Nuclear Risks: The Views of Industry, Governments, and Nongovernmental Organizations

123 5 Nuclear Risks: The Views of Industry, Governments, and Nongovernmental Organizations sharon squassoni Nuclear commerce is one of the most heavily regulated areas of global trade. In traditional supplier countries, exports often are preceded by government agreements setting a framework for bilateral nuclear cooperation, usually handled as important diplomatic events. Major reactor sales generally require such agreements, although there is no international standard for them. Typically such agreements lay out the scope of cooperation, kinds of research and development , and restrictions on the use of equipment and technology. Actual exports must be approved (licensed) and in some cases subjected to multiple regulations for equipment, technology, and know-how. On an international level, the governments of nuclear suppliers coordinate and harmonize their export control regulations under the auspices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), sharing sensitive information about attempted proliferation. In such circumstances, it would be easy to assume that governments play the most important role in nonproliferation and in the formulation, implementation , and enforcement of export policy. Actually, this is not far from the mark. One of the common assumptions underlying industry responses to the Brookings survey is that the nuclear power industry has limited responsibility for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This attitude permeates not only industry’s understanding of proliferation but also the way it assesses ideas, suggestions, and recommendations for bolstering its role as a partner in the fight against nuclear power’s misuse. If anything, it gives industry little motivation to become more involved in either assessing the risks or finding solutions. 05-2147-5 ch5.indd 123 9/7/11 3:31 PM 124 sharon squassoni Even so, a potential expansion of nuclear commerce raises some questions that industry cannot afford to ignore: —Are views from industry already incorporated in government policies and regulations, and if so, to what extent? —What is the role of industry in helping prevent the spread of nuclear weapons? —Do industry representatives view proliferation risks, challenges, and solutions in the same way that their governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) do? As the U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation deal and NSG’s subsequent exception for nuclear trade with India demonstrated so clearly a few years ago, nuclear firms and entities can be significantly affected by governmental decisions related to nonproliferation. Yet they may not engage directly in political discussions affecting them. One clear result of the Brookings survey of industry, government , and expert observers is that the level of interaction between government and industry varies from country to country. Where nuclear vendors are government owned either in full or in part, collaboration tends to be close. This does not mean, necessarily, that industry and government share the same objectives. The survey posed two sets of questions. The first set focused on respondents’ opinions of the current challenges to the nonproliferation regime: 1. What does your company/organization consider to be the biggest nuclear proliferation risks? 2. Which elements of the fuel cycle pose the greatest proliferation risk? 3. Does the projected expansion of nuclear energy present proliferation risks? 4. What are the weaknesses and institutional gaps of the current regime? What mistakes can we learn from and what have been the successes to date? 5. To what extent do new technologies increase/decrease risk? The second set elicited views on potential solutions to proliferation challenges: 1. How should the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) be modified, if at all, to better address risks? 2. What is your view of multilateral approaches to fuel cycle assurances? 3. How could the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) better address twenty-first-century challenges? 4. How should we prioritize technical versus institutional solutions? 5. Does industry need to partner with government? What should be the relationship? Specific responses to questions about proliferation challenges can be seen in table 5-1 (p. 131), and those about potential solutions for strengthening the nonproliferation regime in table 5-2 (p. 136). 05-2147-5 ch5.indd 124 9/7/11 3:31 PM nuclear risks 125 Industry Views on Challenges Industry respondents overwhelmingly share the view that the expansion of the nuclear energy sector per se is not a proliferation risk. In their view, the regime is “robust” as it applies to industry. The current system of “close and efficient” monitoring and regulation of industry by government and international organizations , they argue, has worked for more than three decades. Some observed, however, that governments are increasingly...