Business and Nonproliferation: Industry's Role in Safeguarding a Nuclear Renaissance

2. Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation: Today's Challenges

17 2 Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation: Today’s Challenges sharon squassoni For nuclear security writ large, a major expansion of nuclear energy could present both traditional and new challenges. Although the nuclear nonproliferation regime provides assurances that nuclear power is not misused for weapons purposes, the dual-use nature of the technology means that regardless of intent, some nuclear capabilities could provide a baseline from which a nuclear weapons program could proceed. Traditional concerns about the expansion of nuclear power reactors are minor compared with concerns about the expansion of other capabilities, including uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, fast breeder reactors, and heavy-water production. New challenges will arise from the geopolitics of nuclear energy. Much of the projected growth in global electricity demand will occur in countries outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Introducing nuclear energy in these countries will require significant efforts to meet international safety, physical protection, and nonproliferation standards. In regions with terrorist activity, nuclear power plants could be perceived as attractive targets for sabotage.1 In recent years, there have been a few terrorist plots against nuclear facilities, including the alleged plot by a group of Pakistani Americans to attack the Karachi nuclear reactor, initial plans by al Qaeda to crash an aircraft into a U.S. nuclear facility, and the 2006 “Toronto 18” plot by an Islamic fundamentalist group to use a truck bomb to attack a nuclear power facility in Ontario, Canada.2 Analysts maintain that terrorist attacks, efforts to purchase a nuclear weapon, or efforts to purchase materials to make a nuclear bomb or 02-2147-5 ch2.indd 17 9/7/11 3:26 PM 18 sharon squassoni radiological device are not idle threats. This contention is highlighted by former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director general Mohamed ElBaradei ’s declaration: “The gravest threat the world faces today . . . is that extremists get hold of nuclear or radioactive materials.”3 A second challenge is how nuclear power is perceived within politically volatile regions. Nuclear power is concentrated in Europe, North America, and Northeast Asia, not spread across the globe. There are many regions that have no nuclear power plants or just one or two. While some maintain that nuclear power is no longer prestigious, in areas like the Middle East, this may not be the case. The fundamentally dual-use nature of nuclear material could cause some regional rivals to assume that their neighbors are acquiring equipment and expertise in support of a latent nuclear weapons capability. Such a process could develop over time and change as politics evolve. For example, little outcry was raised against plans to build many nuclear power reactors in Iran under the shah in the 1970s, but this is not the case today.4 This problem could become more acute if capabilities expand to sensitive fuel cycle facilities. Iran is the most notable case right now, but other countries have not ruled out acquiring sensitive capabilities. From a nonproliferation perspective, uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing facilities are the most sensitive parts of the fuel cycle. These facilities could produce fissile material for use in peaceful fuel or for bombs. Only a handful of countries operate these facilities—mostly nuclear weapon states and a few advanced nuclear states such as Japan, Germany, and the Netherlands. Brazil will soon commercialize its uranium enrichment capabilities, which were developed under its clandestine nuclear program. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) contains no prohibitions on acquiring uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing capabilities , as long as they are safeguarded. Renewed interest in acquiring commercial uranium enrichment, reprocessing facilities, or both—prompted either by perceived commercial opportunities or energy security concerns about relying on other nations for the provision of these services—coupled with a projected build-out rate of new reactors not seen since the 1960s, makes a coherent response all the more important. Charting the Path for Nonproliferation: The NPT and Nuclear Energy When the NPT was opened for signature in 1968, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in an arms race that deployed more than 60,000 nuclear weapons across the globe. Although efforts had begun some twenty years earlier to control both the nuclear weapons and the facilities and materials to produce them, progress was slow, and the treaty that emerged from the Eighteen 02-2147-5 ch2.indd 18 9/7/11 3:26 PM nuclear energy and nonproliferation 19...