Crescent of Crisis: U.S.-European Strategy for the Greater Middle East

Proposals for Improved Stability in Afghanistan

Proposals for Improved Stability in Afghanistan Barnett R. Rubin Since the overthrow of the Taliban by the U.S.-led coalition and the inauguration of the interim authority based on the UN-mediated Bonn Agreement of December 5, 2001, Afghanistan has progressed toward stability.1 Not all trends are positive, however. In the first half of 2005, violence by Taliban, al Qaeda, and criminal elements increased, including kidnappings and bombings aimed at expatriates and attacks on Afghan police and coalition forces. Afghanistan has become more dependent on narcotics production and trafficking than any other country in the world, and initial counternarcotics efforts were misdirected and ineffective. Afghanistan remains one of the world’s most impoverished and conflict-prone states, where only a substantial international presence prevents a return to war. The modest results reflect the modest resources that donor and troop-contributing states have invested in it. Afghans and those supporting their efforts have many achievements to their credit, but declarations of success are premature. The establishment of the major institutions required by the constitution of 2004 will mark the end of the implementation of the Bonn Agreement . That agreement on transitional governmental institutions, pending the reestablishment of permanent constitutional governance, was drafted and signed at the UN talks on Afghanistan in Germany in NovemberDecember 2001. The election of the lower house of parliament (Wolesi 145 06-1689 section5 11/15/05 6:15 PM Page 145 Jirga) and provincial councils, held on September 18, 2005, marks the end of that transitional process. The establishment of elected institutions hardly constitutes the end of Afghanistan’s transition toward stability. The long-term strategic objective of the joint international-Afghan project is the building of a legitimate , effective, and accountable state. State building requires balanced and mutually reinforcing efforts to establish legitimacy, security, and an economic base for both. Thus far internationally funded efforts to establish legitimacy through a political process (the only mandatory part of the Bonn Agreement) have outpaced efforts to establish security and a sustainable economic base. The next strategic objective must be to accelerate the growth of government capacity and the legitimate economy to provide Afghans with superior alternatives to relying on patronage from commanders, the opium economy, and the international presence for security, livelihoods, and services. At the same time, Afghanistan must be integrated into its region so that its neighbors play a stabilizing rather than destabilizing role. Afghanistan will not be able to sustain many of the new institutions built with foreign assistance. Given current salary levels and future staffing plans, maintaining the Afghan National Army will eventually impose a recurrent cost on the Afghan government estimated at about $1 billion a year, and the government plans to include this amount in the national budget in 2006. In 2004 expenses for the Afghan National Army amounted to 17 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). A sustainable ratio of defense spending to GDP is normally in the range of 2 to 4 percent. But for Afghanistan to cover the cost of its national army with 4 percent of legal GDP, it would have to more than quintuple its legal economy. The constitution requires Afghanistan to hold presidential elections every five years, Wolesi Jirga elections every five years, provincial council elections every four years, and district council elections every three years. This works out to between eight to ten nationwide elections every decade, depending on whether presidential and Wolesi Jirga elections are concurrent. Currently each election (including voter registration ) costs international donors more than $150 million, which is equivalent to nearly one half of the government’s current yearly domestic revenue. Hence the current efforts risk leaving Afghanistan with elections it cannot afford and a well-trained and well-equipped army that it cannot pay. BARNETT R. RUBIN 146 06-1689 section5 11/15/05 6:15 PM Page 146 This paper proposes a number of changes in the current configuration of international assistance to and investment in Afghanistan’s security, governance, economic reconstruction, and integration into its region. The analysis in each of these areas of international assistance is preceded by an overview of international actors and a brief assessment of the current situation and dilemmas and is followed by specific policy recommendations. It concludes by outlining a “Kabul agenda” to succeed the “Bonn process” in guiding Afghanistan’s transition to stability and responsible sovereignty. International Policy Actors and Missions Several distinct, overt policy interventions...