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Parties versus Interest Groups Sidney M. Milkis Sidney M. Milkis is the James Hart Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia and an expert on political parties and their role in American government . He served as an expert witness for the Republican National Committee , one of the lead plaintiffs in the McConnell case. Milkis’s report focused on the historic development and functions of political parties in American politics and his views on the likely effect of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 on party activity. In this excerpt, he contends that the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) strengthened candidate-centered campaigns and interest groups at the expense of political parties. He argues that the growth of soft money and other resources revitalized political parties and strengthened their role as intermediaries between the political system and interest groups. Consequently, instead of corrupting the political process, political parties have made the political system less corrupt and more responsive to the concerns of the electorate. Milkis further argues that the reform act will diminish the national character of party organizations and, like FECA, will strengthen the influence of interest groups in American politics. Since the dawn of the twentieth century, many factors have threatened the indispensable yet fragile place of parties in American politics, including the growth of the mass media and the development of a mass entertainment industry. But these forces would have been far less debilitating were it not for reforms such as the direct primary, registration laws, and campaign finance reforms. The campaign finance laws of the 1970s—the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the 1974 amendments that were added to it—further advanced a reform effort to “purify” politics—to eliminate even the “appearance” of corruption. But these initiatives, in fact, enhanced the role of special interests, attenuated the link between representatives and their constituents, and made political life seem less relevant and more remote from the everyday lives of American citizens, thus contributing to the decline of participation in elections. The campaign finance laws strengthened candidate-centered campaigns and interest groups at the expense of parties. By limiting the amount of money parties could give to candidates, FECA required candidates to raise more money on their own. The success of candidates thus 40 02 1583-8 part1a 3/25/03 12:00 PM Page 40 became dependent on their individual abilities to raise money needed for high media visibility and the construction of a personal organization. Moreover, by limiting the amount of money any individual could contribute , FECA reduced the role of large contributors and at the same time gave incentives for the formation of federal political action committees (PACs); FECA also encouraged the creation of unregulated groups that operated entirely outside of the disclosure requirements. Consequently, during the 1970s, the number of PACs exploded. PACs, organizations formed by interest groups for the primary or sole purpose of giving money to candidates, did not begin with the campaign finance laws. Prior to the 1970s, labor and business organizations, which were prohibited from making direct contributions to federal campaigns, formed political action committees that allowed them to participate in the political process. But PACs multiplied rapidly after the campaign finance laws restricted the role of parties in funding elections; indeed, FECA specifically legitimized PACs by explicitly granting to both corporations and labor unions the right to create, administer, and raise funds for their PACs, and to cover all organizational expenses from corporate and union treasuries. From 1974 to 1982 the number of political action committees organized by business and unions more than quadrupled, increasing from 608 to 2,601. In the next six years, PACs of all types (including those unconnected to business and unions) rose to a total of 4,268 in 1988. There were 4,328 federal PACs as of March 31, 2002. PACs thus became a rival to political parties in support of candidates but without obligations to govern or to appeal broadly to electorates. Equally important, the growing influence of advocacy groups strengthened pressure group politics: during the 1970s, advocacy groups exercised power by influencing congressional committees, administrative agencies, and courts, advancing policies that were not vetted in elections and the legislative process. Some interest groups did generate large rosters of supporters through direct mail solicitations. But these appeals to the public asked not so much for the citizens’ votes, time, energy, and ideas as for contributions to fund campaigns waged by policy experts. Consequently, as the political scientist...

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