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Party and Interest Group Electioneering in Federal Elections David B. Magleby David B. Magleby is the dean of the Family, Home and Social Science College at Brigham Young University, director of the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, and Distinguished Professor of Political Science. He was an expert witness for the defense and reported on interest group and political party electioneering advocacy research that he and his nationwide team of academic specialists have conducted during the 1998 and 2000 election cycles. This selection begins with Magleby’s discussion of the regulatory and strategic incentives that have encouraged individuals and interest groups to pursue candidate-specific issue advocacy communications, which he takes to mean “electioneering communications,” rather than communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of federal candidates. He then presents examples of the various approaches used by noncandidate groups in recent elections to campaign on behalf of specific candidates without being subject to the disclosure and contributions limits of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). Magleby summarizes the strategies and techniques used in group election advocacy efforts, including the themes and content of the messages, the ways groups mask their identities, and the methods they employ in targeting their efforts. These tactics, he argues, make it difficult for voters to ascertain the sources of the messages they are receiving. For the most part, he notes, these electioneering efforts are directly related to federal elections rather than legislative lobbying and can have a significant effect on the dynamics and outcome of federal elections, especially in close contests. Electioneering Advocacy by Groups and Individuals Interest groups and individuals have multiple means to seek to influence the outcome of a federal election. Many of these strategies fall under the scope of the FECA and Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). However , interest groups, individuals, corporations, and unions have found 147 Scholarly Analyses 04 1583-8 part2a 3/25/03 12:01 PM Page 147 ways to conduct electioneering and circumvent FECA requirements. Some provisions of BCRA seek to remedy this situation. In this section, I review what the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy (CSED) case studies have found about election advocacy and genuine issue advocacy in the 1998 and 2000 elections, including five presidential primary elections. My research also demonstrates that the absence of magic words is not a reliable indication that a message lacks an electioneering purpose. Groups and individuals can very effectively communicate a “vote against” or “vote for” message without using the magic words. Electioneering advocacy— whether broadcast advertisements or direct mail or other forms of advocacy —is clearly focused on defeating or electing a candidate and not primarily focused on an issue. This is demonstrated by the CSED survey research, by the content of the ads, by the fact that these ads are concentrated in competitive races, and by the fact that most ads run in the period shortly before an election. Why Conduct Electioneering Outside the FECA Framework? There are four primary reasons to conduct electioneering outside the FECA framework. First, it permits groups and individuals to avoid disclosure . Second, it allows them to avoid contribution limits. Third, it permits some groups (such as corporations and labor unions) to spend from generally prohibited sources. And fourth, it allows greater control of message and activity while still influencing an election. avoid disclosure. The 1996, 1998, and 2000 election cycles all saw examples of groups who sought to avoid accountability for their communications by pursuing an electioneering advertising/election advocacy strategy rather than limiting their activities to independent expenditures or other activities expressly permitted by the FECA. In 1996 a group that masked its identity was Koch Industries, which financed, at least in part, a group acting in several races named Triad. One of the congressional races where Triad was active in 1996 was the Kansas Third Congressional District.1 In 1998 the AFL-CIO helped pay for ads in the Connecticut Fifth Congressional District race through a group named the Coalition to Make Our Voices Heard. Steven Rosenthal defended campaigning under an obscure name in this case saying, “Frankly we’ve taken a page out of their book [other interest groups] because in some places it’s much more effective to run an ad by the ‘Coalition to Make Our Voices Heard’ than it is to say paid for by ‘the men and women of the AFL-CIO.’”2 Mr. 148 issue advocacy: scholarly analyses 04 1583-8 part2a 3/25/03 12:01...

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