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Scenarios in which terrorists use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been posited for decades, but the threat and the issues involved have received new attention in the early 2000s.1 U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has reformulated what has been popularly called the “sum of all fears” as the “nexus between weapons of mass destruction and terrorist networks,” arguing that we “really have to think very carefully about what we do as a people, and as a world, and as a society.”2 This nexus—part of a more complex and interrelated composite picture of threats and vulnerabilities— and the new interdisciplinary approaches to dealing with these problems are central to the theme of this volume.3 It addresses them through the prism of a radically new initiative incorporated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, adopted on April 28, 2004, under the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.4 The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons was declared a threat to international peace and security at the heads of state summit of the Security Council on January 31, 1992, but this was presented in a statement, not a legally binding resolution. Both the United States and the members of the European Union see WMD proliferation as one of their main security challenges.5 Consensus ends there, however, because there is little agreement on how this threat can best be dealt with, especially when there are the additional concerns of terrorism and also, as recently underscored by UNSCR 1540, illicit trafficking.6 The May 2003 U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative to establish an ad hoc counter-proliferation arrangement, the December 2003 revelations of 1 Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Role of Resolution 1540 and Its Implications peter van ham and olivia bosch 3 01-1017-8 CH 01 1/10/07 12:18 PM Page 3 the Khan global smuggling network for nuclear weapon–related technologies, which included end-users such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea, and growing worries about the fissures in the bio-weapons verification mechanisms have all reinforced the urgency of the need to keep WMD out of the “wrong hands.”They have underlined the fact that existing non-proliferation treaties and regimes, although important, are inadequate and not universal in their coverage. Against this background, UNSCR 1540 was passed in April 2004, to try to address the inadequacies of existing measures and the particular challenge of controlling WMD proliferation by non-state actors. The Resolution’s primary requirements are that states: —“refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery” (operative paragraph (OP) 1); 7 —“adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any nonState actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them” (OP 2); and —“take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials . . . ”by developing security, physical protection, border, and export controls (OP 3). This chapter examines the strategic context of the Resolution, its origins and affiliation with UN resolutions on counter-terrorism, and its significance and features. It goes on to look at what constitutes a non-state actor in this context and the significance of the biological and life sciences community, for which, unlike the nuclear and chemical sectors, there is no one international organization associated with implementing treaties concerning limitations or bans on these sectors’materials for weapons purposes. The implementation of the Resolution is examined with respect to its reinforcement of the main non-proliferation treaties as well as to its additional requirements to deal with the new proliferation challenges. The chapter concludes with an initial exploratory examination of issues surrounding enforcement, not a focus of the traditional treaty regimes and for which there is a lack of global capacity given the current disparities between states in recognizing, let alone dealing with, the concerns raised by the Resolution. 4 Peter van Ham and Olivia Bosch 01-1017-8 CH 01 1/10/07 12:18 PM Page 4 [3.139.70.131] Project MUSE...

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