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166 The Last Bus to Naypyidaw pavin chachavalpongpun 10 Myanmar was admitted into the ASEAN family in 1997. In the face of strong objections from the West and certain civil society organizations in the region, ASEAN insisted on welcoming Myanmar’s regime, claiming that the admission served the organization’s long-term interests. It wanted to engage the rulers of Myanmar constructively to moderate the regime’s repressive policies. It wanted to counter China’s increasingly tight embrace of the Myanmar junta and its growing influence inside Myanmar, considered a potential threat to ASEAN.1 The organization’s approach to Myanmar underwent multiple modifications over the years, from constructive engagement to flexible engagement and then to forward engagement.2 The ten member countries of ASEAN had their own views and interpretations of these multiple modifications, reaffirming their independence vis-à-vis Myanmar. None of the positions seemed satisfactory. Along the way, Myanmar exploited ASEAN’s mechanisms , taking advantage of the group’s strict principle of noninterference as a political shield. Sadly, many ASEAN members themselves have also suffered from a legitimacy deficiency. This condition allowed Myanmar to manage its domestic affairs without outside interference and moral policing from ASEAN members. Because ASEAN membership is irreversible, and because the Myanmar regime’s behavior has become more unpredictable, ASEAN has embarked on an effort to reconstruct certain identities for Myanmar to justify its membership and to cloak ASEAN’s own discomfort. Fiction versus Reality The incongruity between ASEAN-constructed Myanmar and the reality inside the country resurfaces every so often. In 2009 at least three significant incidents seriously challenged ASEAN’s standing on Myanmar. 10-0505-5 ch10.indd 166 8/30/10 6:12 PM The Last Bus to Naypyidaw 167 First, in May, the Myanmar junta decided to press charges against Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the opposition National League for Democracy, over a bizarre episode wherein an American entered her residence uninvited, which the junta interpreted as a violation of the terms of her house arrest. While ASEAN practiced its usual diplomatic rhetoric, calling for the unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi, the junta found her guilty and extended her house arrest for another eighteen months.3 The sentence effectively bars the National League for Democracy leader from participating in the upcoming election in 2010. Second, in late August there were armed clashes between the Tatmadaw and the Kokang militias, despite previous ceasefire agreements. ASEAN’s concentration on the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and the junta’s reconciliation with the National League for Democracy had eclipsed the fact that the underlying causes of ethnic conflict in Myanmar had not been addressed.4 Third, in September Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced what would become a watershed in U.S. policy toward Myanmar. No longer depending solely on sanctions, the United States was adopting an engagement approach, forming a dual-track policy on Myanmar, and would soon begin a direct dialogue with the junta’s representatives. Although the shift in U.S. policy on Myanmar was welcomed by ASEAN, it could potentially further undermine ASEAN’s position vis-à-vis Naypyidaw. During the past twelve years, myth has unmistakably taken a central stage in ASEAN’s policy toward Myanmar. ASEAN re-created Myanmar’s military regime, the State Peace and Development Council, as a political entity filled with hope and possibility for a thriving democracy. ASEAN’s constructive engagement was designed to make that come true. The group believed that its regional approach would be able to foster change in Myanmar. An envoy from ASEAN was appointed to convince the Myanmar regime to open itself up politically. The real Myanmar, however, has remained unchanged. It has been content to be the black sheep of the ASEAN family. The junta’s refusal to release Aung San Suu Kyi and its continued disregard of the human rights of its own people not only debunked the constructive engagement approach but also gave the lie to ASEAN’s highly romanticized Myanmar policy. ASEAN legitimized Myanmar’s seven-step roadmap to democracy without having looked at it carefully to determine whether it was a real step forward for the country or whether it warranted ASEAN’s support. In an interview, former ASEAN secretary-general Rodolfo Severino noted that ASEAN had fallen into its own “oblivion trap.” Consequently it has become more difficult to criticize Myanmar’s so-called democratization process, especially the junta’s 10-0505-5 ch10.indd 167 8/30/10...

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