Confronting Poverty: Weak States and U.S. National Security

Poverty, Development, and Violent Extremism in Weak States

42 chapter three poverty, Development, and Violent extremism in Weak States coriNNe GraFF In October 2000, a 35-foot craft approached the U.S.S Cole, docked in Aden Harbor, Yemen. Operated by two Saudi suicide terrorists, the small boat was packed with about 600 pounds of powerful explosives. Within minutes, the bombers triggered a blast that ripped through the metal hull of the 9,100-ton vessel, a U.S. Navy destroyer. The explosion killed seventeen American sailors and injured thirty-nine others. It was powerful enough to rattle buildings surrounding the port. While responsibility for the attacks was initially unclear, law enforcement agencies eventually traced them to Osama bin Laden, who, according to the 9/11 Commission , directly supervised, helped plan, and funded the operation.1 Immediately after the U.S.S. Cole attack, the Clinton administration assigned high priority to counterterrorism cooperation in Yemen. After 9/11, U.S. policy focused on special operations missions in Yemen to help track and capture or kill al Qaeda suspects. U.S.-Yemeni intelligence prompted a 2002 U.S. missile strike in Yemen that blew up a car occupied by a top al Qaeda leader. Yemen received U.S. security assistance, including funding to help rebuild its coast guard and monitor land borders, as well as financial and operational support for Yemeni special operations and other military forces, which resulted in numerous arrests.2 Initially, U.S. and Yemeni counterterrorism initiatives seemed to pay off: several terrorist plots were foiled, and the capture of al Qaeda leaders was hailed as a serious blow to the group’s leadership and capabilities in Yemen.3 Yet by 2006 the tide had begun to turn back. Analysts warned of a second generation of al Qaeda–inspired militants taking 03-0390-7 ch3.indd 42 12/8/09 12:21 PM 43 poVertY, DeVeLopMeNt, aND VioLeNt eXtreMiSM iN WeaK StateS root in Yemen. A sharp increase in terrorist attacks soon followed.4 In 2008 a local cell calling itself al Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) twice attacked the U.S. embassy compound in the capital of Sana, killing two Yemenis in a March rocket attack and seventeen people—including one American —in a September bombing plot.5 Other plots linked to al Qaeda have targeted foreign oil workers and facilities, a residential compound housing Americans and other foreign residents, army checkpoints, and tourists visiting the country.6 Saudi Arabia announced in 2009 that many of its most-wanted militants had taken refuge in neighboring Yemen, including the regional leader of al Qaeda.7 Why, eight years after the 9/11 attacks and despite ongoing and initially effective U.S. and Yemeni counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda’s leadership, does the country remain a hot spot for violent extremism? This question has implications far beyond Yemen and bears on Islamic violent extremism globally. Violent extremism should not be construed as the only important transnational threat to U.S. security, as other chapters in this book indicate. Yet the U.S. fight against violent extremism remains a top foreign policy priority and is one we must get right. As even hawkish Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld remarked in 2003, our current approach begs the question: is the United States “capturing, killing or deterring more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?”8 To understand why terrorist activity persists in countries like Yemen, one must move beyond intercepting terrorist leaders and bombers, and examine the conditions that allow violent extremists to operate and attract lower-level recruits and build popular support. Yemen country experts point to numerous drivers and enablers of terrorism, but the one that is increasingly gaining attention is poverty.9 Though situated on the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula, Yemen ranks among the most impoverished places in the world (it is poorer than Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, and the Republic of Congo) and is the world’s sixth fastest-growing country (the population is set to double by 2020).10 The human development challenges that plague much of the Muslim world today—from low-quality education to lack of jobs, corruption, and a deficit of political liberties— all seem to be particularly acute in Yemen. Some warn that diminishing resources are undermining the government’s capacity to mount effective counterterrorism operations and could cause the state to collapse.11 Yet the challenge for U.S. policymakers is how to reconcile the view of country experts...